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ABSTRACT
It is well established that children recognize themselves in mirrors by the
end of infancy, showing awareness of the self as an object in the environment.
However, the cognitive impact of objective self-awareness requires further
elucidation. This gap in the literature is addressed in a series of 7 experiments
exploring the role of self in 3- and 4-year-olds’ event memory. A mnemonic
bias for self-relevant material has been described in adults. This effect is
thought to be based on the organizational properties of a highly elaborated
self-concept and so offers a clear route to study the child’s developing sense
of self. However, very few studies have investigated the ontogeny of this effect.
New evidence is provided to suggest that preschool children, like adults,
show a mnemonic advantage for material that has been physically linked
with the self through performance of a depicted action (Experiment 1).
Moreover, 3- and 4-year-olds show a bias for material that has been visually
and linguistically processed with the self-image (Experiments 2, 3, and 4)
and material that has been socio-cognitively linked to the self in terms of
ownership (Experiments 5, 6, and 7). The data imply that both bottom-up
(kinesthetic feedback and self-concept) and top-down (attention) aspects
of self-reflection may play a supporting role in early event memory, perhaps
representing a nascent form of autobiographical processing. Importantly, this
research highlights a promising methodology for elucidating the executive
role of the self in cognition. Following William James’s (1890) influential
conception of the self, it seems that in typical development, “I” is primed to
remember “me.”
vii
MONOGRAPHS OF THE 
SOCIETY FOR RESEARCH
IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT
PDF processed with CutePDF evaluation edition www.CutePDF.com
I. WHY INVESTIGATE MNEMONIC SELF-REFERENCE
EFFECTS IN PRESCHOOLERS?
Self-recognition is a key milestone of human development in both on-
togeny and phylogeny. Possibly unique to the great apes among nonhuman
primates (Gallup, Anderson, & Shillito, 2002), the ability to self-recognize
typically emerges in humans at around the age of 2 years. A litmus test of
this development is the mirror mark test of self-recognition (independently
developed by Gallup, 1970, for nonhuman primates, and Amsterdam, 1972,
for human infants). In this test, infants are surreptitiously marked (classically
with rouge) in a visually inaccessible area (such as the forehead). To pass,
they must take appropriate self-directed action when a mirror is introduced,
reaching for or trying to remove the mark. This simple behavior indicates
that the participant has inferred a relationship between the mirror image and
themselves. In other words, they have cognitively identified themselves as an
object in the environment.
The development of the capacity for self-recognition might be consid-
ered fundamental to human social cognition and interaction.Without it there
would be no concept of “me” as distinct from “you,” no self-conscious thought
or emotion, no theory of mind, and no moral connection between us. Ar-
guably, few other developmental events have such weighty consequences. Yet
it is only in the past 40 years that measures of the onset of self-recognition have
been elaborated. Moreover, the first objective test of early self-recognition,
the 1970s mirror mark test (Amsterdam, 1972; Gallup, 1970), is still the most
commonly used. In humans, where eventual self-recognition is an established
norm, the mirror test is typically employed with the aim of correlating the
results with other cognitive, linguistic, or emotional measures. This approach
has produced a large body of interesting research (reviewed later), firmly es-
tablishing the “mirror mark test” of self-recognition as a measure indicative of
a wider sense of self-awareness. However, the development of other empirical
tests of early self-recognition has stalled.
This is regrettable because the dependent variable of the mark test, mir-
ror guided reaching for a mark on the face, offers only a limited expres-
sion of self-recognition. Although physical self-monitoring conceivably has
some evolutionary value, the primary consequence of self-recognition is not
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grooming.1 Rather, as outlined earlier, self-recognition spurs the complete
transformation of one’s cognitive and social landscape. Empirical tests that in-
corporate this deeper level of self-recognition may therefore shed more light
on the role of self-reflection in human development. The research described
in this monograph pioneers such tests. Specifically, the studies reported here
were designed to explore the role of self-recognition in event memory—a
fundamental aspect of human cognition—in early life. The methods used
are adapted from an established body of research that describes a mnemonic
bias in adults for material processed as self-relevant. This bias, thought to
be based on the elaborative or organizational properties of the self-concept,
is known as the self-reference effect (SRE). Although offering a potentially
simple route to observe an important functional aspect of self-recognition,
only a handful of studies (N = 6) have investigated this effect in childhood.
Moreover, despite the early onset of self-recognition, only one of these studies
looked for the effect in children younger than 5 years of age.
An advantage of using the SRE paradigm to study the emergence of self
is that it allows investigation of the self as a “whole.” Most simplistically de-
scribed as the belief “I am me, I was me, I will be me,” the human experience
of personal identity is a universally experienced, yet under-researched, phe-
nomenon. In making the claim “I am me, I was me, I will be me,” we refer
to distinct aspects of the self. A distinction can be made not only between
the self in the past, present, and future but also between the agentive “I”
and the descriptive “me.” Indeed, William James (1890) was the first to make
this distinction, breaking self-knowledge into various categories (material, so-
cial, spiritual) and referring to the “I” self as the keeper of this knowledge,
greater than the sum of its parts. Modern researchers have followed suit, seek-
ing to understand self-awareness by categorizing various aspects of the self
(e.g., see Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Lewis, 1991; Neisser, 1988). However, the
sum of these parts (the “I”) has largely been left to philosophical enquiry.
Moreover, in modern research, the Jamesian “I” is often equated with the
self-perceived subjectively (e.g., kinesthetic feedback), contrasting this to ob-
jective self-knowledge. However, agency is experienced both subjectively and
objectively. It requires explicit self-reflection to abstract from the sum of parts
the claim for “I” (a unified personal identity). Likewise, subjective experience
arises from many aspects of objective knowledge (consider the knowledge “I
am charitable”).
Perhaps understandably, psychologists have tended to avoid this overlap,
studying the self in strict dichotomy. However, over a century since James’s
(1890) dissection of the self, attempts to put the self back together again
are arguably long overdue. This is regrettable because James (1890), and
subsequently Mead (1934), offered a relatively simple empirical route to the
study of the elusive “I.” They suggested that agentive experience of the self
might be measured by focusing on the consequences, as opposed to the
2
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content, of self-recognition. The idea here is that in observing the cognitive
or behavioral impact of self-recognition, we infer the existence of a self-
reflective agent. The SRE paradigm, measuring the impact of self-recognition
on memory, represents such a method. Moreover, it is well suited to capture
the interplay between subjective and objective factors that constitute real-life
experience of self-awareness. By applying this method in early childhood, we
might achieve a fuller picture of the onset of self-awareness than one based on
the mirror mark test (though see a later discussion of the twin contribution
of “I” and “me” to mirror self-recognition).
Finally, the SRE paradigm also has the potential to provide an alternative
route to the study of autobiographical memory, the onset and foundation
of which has been the subject of much controversy (see Howe, Courage, &
Edison, 2003, for a review of competing theories). For adults and children,
autobiographical memory has typically been measured by eliciting event nar-
ratives. Previous research suggests that preschool children can report de-
tailed memories for life events after sizable delays. For example, Fivush,
Hudson, and Nelson (1984) reported that preschool children were able to
recall and identify pictures of a museum and its layout up to 1 year after
they had visited it with their play group. Similarly, Hammond and Fivush
(1991) found that 2.5- to 4-year-old children could accurately answer ques-
tions about a trip to Disneyland after an 18-month delay. These studies show
that, when prompted, preschool children can report explicit memories of
past events. However, autobiographical memories cannot be reduced to ex-
ternal expression. To access and maintain information concerning one’s in-
volvement in a past event requires an internal, autobiographically organized
system. It is arguably this system, as opposed to its linguistically and socially
challenging product (a narrative), which is at the root of personal iden-
tity. Following this reasoning, the studies described in this monograph aim
not to elicit early autobiographical event narratives but to experimentally
assess the extent to which the self has an active role in preschoolers’ event
memory.
The SRE paradigm has the potential to provide theoretically rich and eco-
logically valid data concerning the cognitive, and in particular themnemonic,
impact of self-recognition in early life. In the remainder of this chapter, previ-
ous research concerning the onset of self-recognition and its cognitive and so-
cial correlates is reviewed, paying particular attention to what themirrormark
test of self-recognition implies for a wider sense of self-awareness. There then
follows a review of evidence linking the development of self-recognition and
memory, including the small number of studies applying the SRE paradigm in
childhood. Finally, the key research questions that are addressed by our own
studies are described. The primary aim of this chapter is to set the current
research in historical and theoretical context, providing an integrative basis
for later interpretation of our results.
3
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-RECOGNITION
Supporting a precocious capacity for self-recognition, newborn infants
discriminate their own cries from those of others, failing to show contagion of
distress when exposed to their own, rather than another infant’s prerecorded
cry (Dondi, Simion, & Caltran, 1999; Martin & Clark, 1982). Moreover, by
3 months of age, infants appear to discriminate their own image from the im-
ages of others. Field (1979) demonstrated that 3-month-olds show decreased
social and cardiac responses to their own mirror image versus the visual
stimulus of a peer. Further, Bahrick and Watson (1985) and Legerstee, An-
derson, and Shaffer (1998) showed that 3- and 5-month-old infants appear
already familiar with their own image, preferring to view a live video image
of an unfamiliar peer. Legerstee et al. (1998) and Rochat and Striano (2002)
reported that, at least by 4 months, infants make significantly more social
responses (vocalizing and smiling) to live representations of other people,
even when contingency is controlled for through mimicry.
However, children do not behave as though they have a cognitive under-
standing that they are the object reflected in themirror (an idea of “me”) until
the end of infancy. As noted, this aspect of self-awareness is measured by the
mirror mark test of self-recognition (Amsterdam, 1972; Gallup, 1970). The
finding that children below the age of 18 months typically fail the mark test
of mirror self-recognition is robust (see Anderson, 1984, for an early review;
later papers include Asendorf & Baudonniere, 1993; Asendorf, Warkentin, &
Baudonniere, 1996; Bard, Todd, Bernier, Love, & Leavens, 2006; Courage,
Edison, & Howe, 2004; Howe et al., 2003; Lewis & Ramsay, 2004; Nielsen &
Dissanayake, 2004; Nielsen, Dissanayake, & Kashima, 2003; Nielsen, Sudden-
dorf, & Slaughter, 2006; Vyt, 2001).
Importantly, younger infants do not fail the mark test due to an inabil-
ity to follow task requirements. Prompts drawing attention to the marked
area, or asking children to wipe the mark with a tissue, do not alter behavior
(Courage et al., 2004; Howe et al., 2003). Likewise, younger infants per-
form well when asked to respond to directly visible marks on their mother’s
face (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979), a doll’s face (Asendorf et al., 1996; Bard
et al., 2006), or their own hand (Nielsen et al., 2003). Comparing infants
with and without prior exposure to mirrors, Priel and de Schonen (1986)
showed that although locating other objects using the mirror was related to
previous experience of reflective surfaces, self-directed behavior was not. In
doing so, Priel and de Schonen (1986) supported the cross-cultural validity
of the test. Although there appear to be cultural variations in the onset of
mirror self-recognition within the 18- to 24-month window, later work has
supported the conclusion that mirror self-recognition is universal (Keller et
al., 2004). Note, although this result provides welcome validation of the mark
test, it also confirms that the developmental period during which themark test
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can be used to differentiate children in terms of self-awareness is extremely
limited.
Priel and de Schonen’s (1986) results imply that prior experience of
mirrors is not necessary for contingency detection in a mirror image. How-
ever, in populations where mirrors are common, it is not clear if contingency
awareness precedes mirror self-recognition. Lewis and Brooks-Gunn (1979)
reported that 8-month-olds looked longer at a live image of themselves than
a delayed self-image, or a prerecorded image of another child. Likewise,
Field (1979) reported that, although reacting more positively to an image of
a peer, 3-month-old infants looked longer at their mirror image. However,
as noted, several other reports indicate that infants prefer images of oth-
ers to contingent images of themselves (Bahrick & Watson, 1985; Legerstee
et al., 1998; Rochat & Striano, 2002). Although the direction of bias differs,
these studies imply that very young infants distinguish displays on the basis
of contingency. In other words, they appear to have a sense of agency (“I”)
that facilitates implicit self-recognition. In support of a link between agency
and preference, Morgan and Rochat (1995) found that although infants pre-
ferred viewing another infant’s kicking legs to their own when no goal was
involved, this pattern was reversed when kicking the object activated a sound.
However, in a more recent longitudinal sample of 9- to 24-month-old
infants, Nielsen et al. (2003) failed to find a significant preference in either
direction prior to 18months. Tracking preferences individually, infants began
to prefer their own image to that of a peer only in the session where they first
demonstratedmirror self-recognition asmeasuredby themark test. This result
implies that implicit self-recognition (asmeasured by preference) and explicit
self-recognition (as measured by the mark test) may not be developmentally
dissociable. Preference is notoriously difficult to interpret, and a potentially
less ambiguousmeasure of contingency detection is provided by object search
studies. However, the results remain equivocal. Bertenthal and Fischer (1978)
and Bigelow (1981) reported that prior to mirror self-recognition, infants are
able to use the mirror to guide their search for objects: for example, reaching
up to a hat held above their head or turning around to fetch a toy. However,
more recently, Vyt (2001) and Courage et al. (2004) showed that the ability
to use reflective surfaces to infer the location of objects is variable in onset,
sometimes preceding and sometimes following mirror self-recognition.
Perhaps the clearest evidence for the role of contingency in mirror self-
recognition is the finding that identification of self in the mirror typically
precedes identification of the self in static photographs by a few months
(Brooks-Gunn & Lewis, 1984; Courage et al., 2004; Johnson, 1982; Lewis &
Brooks-Gunn, 1979). This simple test strongly suggests that cognitive repre-
sentation of one’s own features (“me”) can, at least briefly, be dissociated from
cognitive identification arising from proprioceptive or kinesthetic feedback
(a sense of “I”). However, experimentally manipulating contingency does not
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always produce such straightforward results. In an innovative adaptation of
themark test, Povinelli, Landau, and Perilloux (1996) showed children videos
depicting amarking event that had taken place 3min earlier. Despite labeling
these images as self-referent, the majority of 2-year-olds failed to reach for the
mark until a contingency-providing stimulus (the mirror) was introduced.
Further, it was not until the age of 4 years that the majority of children ex-
hibited mark-directed behavior. Given that both 2- and 3-year-olds were able
to label their video image (implying self-recognition), Povinelli et al. (1996)
interpreted this result as suggesting that younger children cannot objectively
connect the experience of past and present selves. That is, although they can
use contingency cues and feature matching to recognize themselves in the
present, they have no explicit representation of the self in the past.
In support of a specific deficit in self-conservation,2 2- and 3-year-olds
appear to be aware that videos can reflect nonself-referent aspects of the
past; they can learn to use videos of hiding events to guide their search
for objects (Skouteris, Boscaglia, & Searl, 2009; Skouteris & Robson, 2006;
Skouteris, Spataro, &Lazaridis, 2006; Suddendorf, 2003; Troseth, 2003).How-
ever, implying that any developmental lag in self-conservation is not as wide
as originally proposed, this training facilitates 3-year-olds’ (but not 2-year-
olds’) mark-directed behavior (Skouteris et al., 2009; Skouteris et al., 2006;
Skouteris & Robson, 2006). Of further detriment to Povinelli et al.’s (1996)
account, there is evidence to suggest that younger childrenmistrust video self-
representations even when they are live. Although it is widely assumed that
live video footage is an adequate mirror substitute, Povinelli, Landau, and
Perilloux (1996; Experiment 3) found that only 60% of 3-year-olds passed the
mark test in this medium.
In response to this, and similar findings (Johnson, 1982; Vyt, 2001),
Suddendorf, Simcock, and Nielsen (2006) directly compared mirror self-
recognition and live video self-recognition in a sample of 2- to 3-year-olds.
Strikingly, although 90% of 2-year-olds passed the mirror test, only 35%
passed a mark test using a live video. Tallying with the revised pass mark
for the delayed test, success in the live video test did not match that of the
mirrormark test until the age of 3 years. This result was replicated by Skouteris
et al. (2009). Although Demir and Skouteris (2008) demonstrated that 2- and
2.5-year-olds’ ability to pass the live mark test could be improved by training,
performance was not brought to ceiling. This result suggests that video-based
tasks put younger children at a disadvantage even when contingency is held
constant.
Circumventing such concerns, an alternative task for self-awareness in
which self-reflection is fully internalized has recently been revived. Inspired
by the observations of Piaget (1953/1977), Geppert and Kuster (1983) and
Bullock and Lutkenhaus (1990) tested whether young children sitting on a
mat appreciated that their body weight was an obstacle when attempting to
6
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hand the mat to the experimenter. They found that passing this task on-
togenetically preceded mirror self-recognition (Bullock & Lutkenhaus, 1990;
Gepper & Kuster, 1983). More recently, Moore, Mealiea, Garon, and Povinelli
(2007) developed a new apparatus, designed to provide a less familiar (and
so less easily solved) problem. In this task, children are placed on a rug that
is attached to the axle of a shopping trolley and are encouraged to push the
trolley toward their mother. For the trolley to move, children first have to
step off of the rug. To 15-month-olds’ evident frustration, the need to remove
one’s body weight is not appreciated until 18–21 months of age. As might be
expected, Moore et al. (2007) found that passing this task strongly correlated
with mirror self-recognition. However, unlike mirror self-recognition, which
at least in later stages involves feature matching, this task does not require
accurate knowledge of the body. Most 18- to 26-month-olds make body rep-
resentation errors, such as attempting to put on dolls’ clothes, sit on dolls’
chairs, or squeeze through spaces that are too small (Brownell, Zerwas, &
Ramani, 2007; De Loache, Uttal, & Rosengran, 2004).
Despite recent controversy concerning self-conservation, it is commonly
accepted that mirror self-recognition is indicative not only of embodied or
featural self-awareness, but a wider sense of self-reflection. This conviction is
supported by concurrent developments in linguistic and affective domains.
For example, from around 18 months of age, children begin to refer to them-
selves using their ownname, and as early as 20months they show systematically
correct usage of first- (“I, me, my, mine”) and second-person (“you, yours”)
pronouns (Bates, 1990; Brown, 1973; Hay, 2006). Supporting the view that
linguistic self-reference is premised on objective self-recognition, children
who pass the mirror mark test show more linguistic self-other differentia-
tion than non-self-recognizers (Courage et al., 2004; Lewis & Ramsay, 2004).
Moreover, children’s verbal labeling of the mirror image typically lags slightly
behind nonverbal behavioral indicators (Amsterdam, 1972; Bard et al., 2006;
Bertenthal & Fischer, 1978; Pipp, Fischer, & Jennings, 1987).
Acting on Amsterdam’s (1972) observation of self-admiring and coy mir-
ror behavior in 21- to 24-month-olds, Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger, and Weiss
(1989) confirmed that embarrassment (expressed through averted gaze with
smile, blushing, facial touching) typically occurred in self-recognizers but
not non-self-recognizers, both in the mirror- and in public-exposure situa-
tions (e.g., being asked by the experimenter to sing). Children’s empathic
reactions to others’ distress (as measured by sad facial expressions, proso-
cial helping, sharing, and comforting) have also been repeatedly linked to
the onset of mirror self-recognition (Bischof-Kohler, 1991; Johnson, 1982;
Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, Wagner, & Chapman, 1992). These results are
notable because to feel embarrassment or empathy one must consider one-
self as other, that is, pass an emotional analog of the mirror test. However,
cognitive and emotional consideration of self and other are not complete at
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age of 2 years. Self-conscious emotions involving evaluation of self against a
standard (as in, e.g., pride or shame) are not established until at least 3 years
of age.
For example, Heckhausen (1984 and later Stipek, Recchia, & McClintic,
1992) found that following success in a competitive task, 3- and 4-year-olds
(but not 2-year-olds) looked toward their competitor, stretched their body and
arms upwards, and displayed positive affect. Following failure, the children no
longer made eye contact, their body shrunk downwards, and they displayed
negative affect. These reactions are consistent with the protypical expressions
of pride and shame. Further, Lewis, Alessandri, and Sullivan (1992) demon-
strated that by the age of 3 years, children show more pride when succeeding
on difficult than easy tasks, and the converse for failing and shame. This
confirms that children’s reactions are not simply based on positive and neg-
ative outcomes. More recently, Kochanska, Gross, Lin, and Nichols (2002)
reported that the level of self-recognition reflected in language and behavior
at 18 months correlated with “guilty” behavior (averted gaze, body tension,
distress) following a staged mishap in the laboratory at 22 and 33 months.
Mothers’ reports of naturally occurring guilty reactions (averted gaze, body
tension, distress, seeking reparation) increased during this period.
Bringing all of these facets of self-awareness together, Stipek, Gralinski,
and Kopp (1990) pioneered a parental questionnaire of infants’ self-concept
development with three factors. Factor 1 referred to self-description and eval-
uation (e.g., Does your child ever use evaluative language to refer to them-
selves?). Factor 2 referred to bodily self-recognition (e.g., Does your child
recognize herself in mirrors?). Factor 3 related to emotional responses to
wrongdoing (e.g., Does your child ever seem upset when calling attention to
something he/she has done wrong?). Collecting data for a sample of 19- to
40-month-olds, Stipek et al. (1990) found the expected developmental pro-
gression at 19–24 months, 91% of children scored highly on self-recognition,
compared to 51% on self-description and evaluation (rising to 91% between
30 and 40 months), and 40% on self-conscious emotion (rising to 59% at
30–40 months).
The studies reviewed here confirm that the onset of mirror self-
recognition is associated with changes children’s in cognitive and social out-
look. However, given that it is logical to infer the impossibility of linguistic
and emotional self-reference without awareness of the referent (the self), cor-
relations between the two might be perceived as circular. Likewise, although
studies tracking the timeline of developments back to self-recognition may
offer a clearer suggestion of a causal relationship, they do not constitute an
experimental method. The research reviewed above raises a host of alterna-
tive routes to the study of early self-awareness (linguistic, emotional, physical),
many of which are potentially less time limited and categorical (pass/fail) than
mirror self-recognition. Yet very few scholars have looked beyond the mirror
8
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mark test for an experimentalmeasure of self-recognition. As noted, we hope to
address this gap by developing a new experimental measure of the functional
impact of self-recognition, taking the SRE paradigm as a starting point. To
support this aim, the following section outlines the links that have previously
been made between the self and memory in early childhood.
SELF-RECOGNITION AND EPISODIC MEMORY IN DEVELOPMENT
Just as a logical link can be made between self-recognition and linguis-
tic and emotional self-reference, a logical link can be made between self-
recognition and autobiographical memory. An autobiographical memory can
be defined as an episodic memory in which the self is acknowledged as the
“experiencer” of the event—in other words, memory for a specific event in
which self-recognition, or self-reflection, is a basic component. The earliest
remembered life events occur between 2 and 8 years, with an established av-
erage of around 3.5 years (Pillemer & White, 1989; Usher & Neisser, 1993).
However, research strongly suggests that from at least 6 months of age, in-
fants’ actions are influenced by past visual-cognitive experiences. Infants who
passively witness an adult playing with an unfamiliar object in a novel way
will later play with the object in the same manner (Collie & Hayne, 1999;
Meltzoff, 1995). This implies that although we do not remember early life
events as adults, as infants we were able to encode and retrieve information
about past events. Howe and colleagues (Howe & Courage, 1993, 1997; Howe
et al., 2003) suggest that the onset of mirror self-recognition, roughly coincid-
ing with the earliest retrospective memory reports, offers a clear explanation
for this “infantile amnesia.” Until children are consciously aware of them-
selves as distinct from others, it is presumably impossible for them to “tag”
memories as their own, and so organize or retrieve them as part of a personal
life narrative. By this account, although infants know something about past
events (as shown by Meltzoff, 1995, and Collie and Hayne’s, 1999, research),
they may not explicitly remember these events as something that happened
to them. Importantly, for an adult to remember details of an event that hap-
pened to them as a child, a link between the adult and child self must be
maintained. It is not clear how this link could persist if the event details were
not originally encoded as self-referent.
In support of this, Howe et al. (2003) tracked children between the ages of
15 and 23 months and found that those who achieved mirror self-recognition
performed reliably better than non-self-recognizers at finding a toy hidden
up to 12 months before. Similarly, Harley and Reese (1999) conducted a lon-
gitudinal study of verbal memory for past real-life events in conjunction with
measures of self-recognition (the mirror test) and reminiscing styles (extent
of elaboration about past events between mother-child dyads) between the
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ages of 19 and 32 months. The results supported a significant role for both
mother-child conversational factors and the extent of self-recognition, with
the latter being a better predictor for strong verbal memory. However, as
noted, correlating two logically related abilities (in this case self-recognition
andmemories of the self) might be perceived as insufficient evidence for a ca-
sual relationship. Moreover, neither study explicitly measured self-reference.
It is conceivable that one could encode information about past events and
even talk about aspects of an event in detail (particularly if supported by
prompting) without explicitly acknowledging/representing the role of self.
On this reading, Howe et al. (2003) and Harley and Reese (1999) may avoid
circularity but fail to tap autobiographical memory. The same criticism can
be made of Fivush et al. (1984) and Hammond and Fivush’s (1991) narra-
tive research. These studies did not separate verbal self-reference from verbal
reference to other aspects of the event. For this reason, without the benefit
of hindsight (as provided by asking an adult to retrieve early memories), it is
debatable if these episodic memories can be considered part of an “autobio-
graphical” system.
The SRE paradigm offers a way to avoid this difficulty, providing a mea-
sure that directly taps self-representation in memory. In adults, the SRE has
typically been studied by contrasting memory for adjectives judged to be
self-descriptive relative to those processed without reference to the self (see
Symons & Johnson, 1997, for a meta-analysis). However, studies referring to
a “subject-performed task effect” (SPT) might also be considered a type of
SRE. The SPT effect refers to a memory bias for statements about actions that
have been acted out relative to actions recited verbally or witnessed being per-
formed by others (see Engelkamp, 1998, for review). Brief definitions of SRE
and SPT effects are reproduced in Textbox 1, for the reader’s reference. As
noted, the SRE is thought to be based on encoding to-be-remembered stimuli
with an often accessed and highly elaborated concept, the self. By contrast,
those researching the SPT effect in adults generally consider it to be based on
lower level proprioceptive feedback unique to the embodied self. However,
echoing our discussion of the “dissected” self, research with children suggests
that cognitive and physical SREs may not be so easily separated. This is impor-
tant because typically formed autobiographical memories seem likely to draw
on both physical and cognitive aspects of personal experience.
 The term self-reference effect (SRE) refers to amemory bias formaterial
that has been judged self-relevant at encoding.
 The term subject-performed task (SPT) effect refers to a memory bias
for actions that have been physically performed by the self.
Textbox 1.—Definition of mnemonic “self-reference” effects.
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One piece of evidence that implies that the SRE and SPT effects may
be confounded in real-life situations comes from Millward, Powell, Messer,
and Jordan (2000). They tested free- and verbally prompted recall for target
events experienced during a 25-min walk by children with and without a diag-
nosis of autism. Half of the target events were experienced by the child; the
remainder by a companion. Millward et al. (2000) found that after they had
returned from the walk, typically developing 5- to 6-year-olds remembered
and expressed more information relating to aspects of the event they had
actively experienced; that is, they showed an SPT effect. However, children
of the same verbal mental age diagnosed with autism showed the opposite
bias, recalling more information about the experiences of their companion.
Confirming that asymmetrical performance is not due to a lack of proprio-
ceptive engagement, Summers and Craik (1994) reported that children with
a diagnosis of autism remember more self-performed than self-verbalized ac-
tions. This suggests that the reversal of the SPT effect in children with autism
is traceable to a difference in cognitive focus, rather than a difference in the
depth of processing of actions.
Evidence supporting a cognitive component for the SPT effect can also
be found in typically developing children, in whom the bias for self- versus
other-performed actions is tempered by the extent of cognitive identification
with “other.” Baker-Ward, Hess, and Flannigan (1990) asked 5- to 8-year-old
children to take turns performing 21 actions with objects and later to recall
the actions made. Children were questioned immediately after the play ses-
sion and again 3 weeks later. Some of the children were also questioned about
the event in the intervening weeks. Baker-Ward et al. (1990) found that re-
gardless of timeframe, repeated questioning, or age, children showed greater
recall of actions they had performed relative to those they had observed be-
ing performed by classmates. However, in a second experiment, Baker-Ward
et al. (1990) showed that the mnemonic advantage for self-performed actions
disappeared when compared to memory for actions performed by the chil-
dren’s most regular playmates. Conceivably, self-performed actions were well
remembered due to subjective feedback, whereas actions performed by highly
familiar others benefited from association with an elaborated person-concept.
However, it is difficult to see how cognitive familiarity could play a role for
others’ actions, but not for own.
Millward et al.’s (2000) and Baker-Ward et al.’s (1990) research suggest
that higher level cognition plays a mediating role when comparing memory
for self- and others’ actions. For this reason, investigation of the functional ef-
fect of self-reflection on memory need not preclude action-based paradigms.
Indeed, in addition to being more ecologically valid, the use of a physical
activity (e.g., play) seems better suited to developmental research than the
complex processing of word lists typically used in SRE studies. Neverthe-
less, researchers using the standard SRE paradigm have had some success
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in demonstrating an effect in young children. For example, Bennett and
Sani (2008) recently demonstrated an SRE for trait descriptions in 5-, 7-, and
10-year-olds. Children recalledmore simple adjectives (clever, friendly, funny,
greedy, happy, messy, naughty, noisy, small, and rough) that had been pro-
cessed with the question “Do you think you are _____?” than those processed
semantically (“Do you think ___ means the same as ____ ?”). Pullyblank,
Bisanz, Scott, and Champion (1985) reported similar results in 7- and 10-
year-olds. Like the research on the SPT effect reviewed earlier, neither of
these SRE studies uncovered a significant interaction between mnemonic
self-bias and age; the effects of self-involvement thus appear to be present in
children as young as 5 years.
Interestingly, Bennett and Sani (2008) found that answering the question
“Do you think people in your family are ______?” also led to better recall than
did semantic processing. This effect, reminiscent of the equalizing effects of
familiarity found by Baker-Ward et al. (1990), has been repeatedly found in
SRE studies using adults. This has led to the criticism that mnemonic self-
bias is premised on familiarity, as opposed to self-awareness (see Symons &
Johnson, 1997). However, social research strongly suggests that identification
with a social group (consisting of familiar others) is a major aspect of an
elaborated self-concept (see Bennett & Sani, 2008; Johnson et al., 2002). In
others words, both self-processing and familiar other processing engage one’s
cognitive identity. Moreover, it is not clear how self-awareness and familiarity
could be separated; the self is, by definition, uniquely familiar. Likewise,
given the continuous link the self provides between encoding and retrieval
conditions, it is arguably in a unique position to facilitate memory. Most
important, whatever the “specialization” of the underlying mechanism, the
minimum requirement for a cognitive SRE is self-recognition.
Using a paradigm especially designed to circumvent the complexity of
trait adjectives and semantic judgements, Sui and Zhu (2005) provided ev-
idence that SREs occur in children as young as 5 years old. Those authors
presented 4-, 5-, and 10-year-old children with pictures showing various ob-
jects being pointed to by a generic figure. To manipulate self-referencing,
this figure was altered to include a photograph of either the child’s own or an
unfamiliar child’s face. For each presentation, the child was asked to report
who was pointing to the object. After a short distraction task, Sui and Zhu
(2005) introduced a surprise recall test. They found that although all age
groups were above chance in monitoring who had pointed to the objects they
recalled, only 5-year-olds named significantly more of the objects associated
with their self-image than those associated with the other image. Ten-year-olds
showed a nonsignificant bias toward self-referent material and 4-year-olds a
nonsignificant bias in the opposite direction. Sui and Zhu (2005) went on
to demonstrate that when the task demands were sufficiently challenging for
10-year-olds, they also showed a significant SRE.
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However, although studies using the SPT and SRE paradigm imply that
the autobiographical organization of memories is underway in early child-
hood, the majority cannot claim to have measured the expression of auto-
biographical memories. To make the step from implicit cognitive represen-
tation of self (indexed as a bias) to explicit cognitive representation of the
self, another measure is required. Specifically, it is necessary, as achieved by
Sui and Zhu (2005), to determine if children can explicitly differentiate the
role of self and other in the event memories expressed. With both measures
in place one can build a strong case for the “real-time” measurement of
autobiographical memory. This is important because it removes the need to
rely on adults retrospective reports of childhood events to categorize themem-
ory as autobiographical. For this reason, careful application of the SPT/SRE
paradigm could revolutionize investigation of the ontogeny of the autobio-
graphical system.
THE CURRENT RESEARCH
The six studies introduced earlier suggest that the SRE paradigm can be
usefully applied to investigate the development of memory and self in both
typically and nontypically developing children. However, each of those studies
was conducted in relative isolation, with different objectives. By contrast, the
seven studies that follow aim to provide an integrated body of work, elucidat-
ing themechanism underlying typically developing SRE and SPT effects, their
relation to autobiographical memory, and their implications for functional
self-recognition. In keeping with these aims, the research was conducted using
a population for which the extent of self-recognition and autobiographical
processing requires further exposition. The target age range for comparison
was between 3 and 4 years. This demographic was targeted because typically
developing children’s ability to self-recognize (a basic requirement for the
SRE) linguistically, emotionally, and inmirrors and photographs can be safely
assumed in children by the age of 3 years. Further, although this developmen-
tal stage has been identified as the first to support lasting autobiographical
memories, there is controversy concerning 3-year-olds’ capacity to represent
the self in the past. Importantly, in contrast to mirror self-recognition, the
magnitude of any SRE/SPT effect found may be sensitive to developmental
change in the preschool period. By developing paradigms that engaged self-
reference appropriate to this age range, we hoped to advance knowledge in
the field by exploring the following key questions:
1. Can children younger than 5 years show SREs? As far as we are
aware, Sui and Zhu’s (2005) study was the first to directly assess the
impact of self-recognition on memory in children younger than
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5 years. Those authors concluded that prior to the age of 5 years,
children’s self-concept, although present, may not be sufficiently
elaborated to have a functional effect on memory. However, as
noted, adults report autobiographical details of events occurring
between the ages of 3 and 4 years (Pillemer & White, 1989). This
suggests that the impact of the self on the organization of event
memories begins in the preschool years and that Sui and Zhu’s
(2005) conclusion is open to challenge.3
2. What forms of self-reference, if any, lead to mnemonic bias for
preschoolers? The preceding discussion highlights that different
forms of self-reference (e.g., physical or cognitive)may contribute
to the SRE in real-life situations. However, the SRE has been
measured in adults almost exclusively using the trait adjective
paradigm. Although there are many studies on SPT effects, this
literature has rarely been brought together. In Experiment 1, we
assess memory for self-performed actions, in Experiments 2–4, we
assessmemory for actions visually associated with the self (through
mocked up photographs), and in Experiment 5–7, we assess mem-
ory for objects cognitively associated with the self through own-
ership. By approaching the SRE from various perspectives, we
hope to move forward the debate concerning the mechanism or
mechanisms underlying this effect.
3. Can early SREs be related to autobiographical memory? Impor-
tantly, all of the previously discussed channels of self-reference
(kinesthetic, visual, cognitive) are likely to contribute to auto-
biographical memories in a natural setting. As noted, the SRE
paradigm has the potential to index both implicit and explicit au-
tobiographical self-reference. When SREs occur in episodic mem-
ory (as indexed by free recall) and make explicit reference to the
self (as indexed by explicit self-other differentiation within the
memory), a strong case can be made for explicit autobiograph-
ical reflection. However, given our younger age range, we were
reluctant to rely solely on a free recall and source-monitoringmea-
sures to assess children’s eventmemories (as in previous SPT/SRE
studies). In keeping with previous preschool research (Fivush et
al., 1984; Hammond & Fivush, 1991; Harley & Reese, 1999), we
wished to provide mnemonic support. Rather than provide ver-
bal scaffolding (which would have been difficult given the rela-
tive simplicity of the to-be-remembered items), we achieved this
by introducing a visual recognition test. This required children
to choose familiar stimuli from a group of distracters. Note, al-
though welcome form a task demands perspective, it is debatable
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whether this measure can be considered to tap episodic (as op-
posed to semantic) memory.
4. Is there developmental change in SREs within this age range?
Previous research suggests that between 5 and 10 years, there
is little developmental change in the SRE (Baker-Ward, Hess,
& Flannigan, 1990; Bennett & Sani, 2008; Millward et al., 2000;
Pullyblank et al., 1985; Sui & Zhu, 2005). However, the ontogeny
of SREs has yet to be explored in the preschool years. Research
on the development of self-recognition has revealed that kines-
thetic feedback (a feeling of agency stemming from contingency
cues) precedes feature matching (visual self-recognition in mir-
rors and photographs), which precedes more complex cognitive
self-recognition (as involved in self-conscious emotions). It is pos-
sible that a similar developmental pattern might be evident for
mnemonic self-recognition; we may see a staggered onset of ef-
fects from kinesthetic, to visual, to cognitive. Moreover, Povinelli
et al.’s (1996) results suggest that 3-year-olds may struggle to re-
fer to the self in the past, at least without training (Skouteris
et al., 2006; Skouteris &Robson, 2006).On this account, SRE/SPT
effects may be absent in younger children, not due to a generally
unelaborated self-concept but due to a self-specific retrieval fail-
ure. There may also be a distinction to be drawn in the onset of
explicitly self-referentmemories (where the child remembers hav-
ing performed the action or judged the stimuli as self-referent)
and implicit self-referent memories (where the child reports no
personalized memory of the event, but the “special” nature of
self-referent memories is reflected by a recall or recognition bias).
This would imply that infantile amnesia is not a problem of self-
recognition, as argued byHowe and colleagues (Howe&Courage,
1993, 1997; Howe et al., 2003), but, as more traditionally held, a
problem of expression.
5. Finally, and perhaps most important, how can using the SRE
paradigm with preschoolers add to current knowledge concern-
ing the development of self? For example, we are interested in ex-
ploring whether mnemonic self-bias (physical, visual, cognitive)
implies not only self-recognition but also self-conservation. This
may help us to qualify the adaptive nature of self-recognition. Not
only do individual self-referent memories have survival value, but
they also may play a formative role in maintaining the feeling of
continuity (and so value) attached to personal identity. Although
this might be particularly apparent when memories are explicit
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and so contribute to a life narrative, implicit representation of the
self may also play a role in promoting positive feelings of famil-
iarity. Of importance, then, the SRE paradigm has the potential
to index a cognitive-behavioral consequence of self-recognition
congruent with the evolutionary and developmentally powerful
implications of self-awareness.
METHODOLOGICAL NOTE
In total, 456 preschool children were recruited, with parental consent,
from 17 mixed demographic nurseries in Scotland. In most cases, testing
took place in a separate room within the nursery building. Each study used
a roughly equal number of boys and girls. The research used a variety of
methods, described in full for each experiment. Means (M) and standard
deviations (SD) are reported for relevant data (in figures, SD are shown as
error bars). All statistical analyses are two-tailed and where possible exact p
values are reported. To ensure the recognition data are a valid reflection of
memory, performance is assessed using one-sample t tests. Chance perfor-
mance is set at 25% for recognition tests and 50% for source monitoring
(including ownership assignment) for all experimenters aside from the final
experiment, where chance performance in the recognition test was set at
33%. Mixed models analyses of variance (ANOVAs) are used to investigate
the impact of age group, and, where appropriate experimental conditions,
on memory. In Experiment 4, which uses only one age group, Pearson’s
correlations are used to explore age effects. For all ANOVAs, partial eta
squared (ηp
2) is presented as an estimate of effect size. This value can be
interpreted following Cohen (1969): ηp
2 > 0.2 large, > 0.1 medium, and
> 0.05 small. To aid clarity, only significant and marginally nonsignificant
(p < .1) results are reported in full.
NOTES
1. Physical self-monitoring might be used to get rid of parasites or to boost attractiveness,
thus improving evolutionary fitness. However, self-monitoring is possible without conscious
awareness of the self, which is cognitively costly. For this reason, superficial self-monitoring is
unlikely to be the primary evolutionary motivator for self-recognition.
2. The term self-conservation is used here and throughout this monograph, as used by
Povinelli, Landau, and Perrilloux (1996) to refer to the link between self in the present and
self in the past. Conceiving of the self as extending into the future is another aspect of self-
conservation and is not addressed by the current research.
3. See Chapter III for further discussion of Sui and Zhu’s (2005) methods and results.
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II. THE IMPACT OF PHYSICAL SELF-REFERENCE ON
PRESCHOOLERS’ MEMORY FOR DEPICTED ACTIONS
In the first experiment, we aimed to determine if, like adults, 3- and
4-year-old children, show better memory for actions they have physically per-
formed than actions they have witnessed being performed. As noted, this
“SPT effect” is generally held to occur due to kinesthetic elaboration of the
to-be-remembered action that comes from self-performance. Compared to
cognitive elaboration of to-be-remembered action (the SRE), this might be
considered a low-level effect. For this reason, we might expect the SPT effect
to emerge first, making it a plausible starting point for exploring the “earli-
est” self-reference effects. However, the traditional SPT paradigm, focusing
on free recall of previously encountered actions, has high linguistic demands.
To reduce these demands for our young sample, we included a visual record
of the actions performed in the encoding session, which was reintroduced
at retrieval. Specifically, each action was modeled by a cartoon actor. This
allowed children’s free recall of the stimuli to be supplemented with a recog-
nition measure. Such measures are important because young children are
likely to be relatively poor at narrative encoding and retrieval, particularly of
primarily perpetually based events (see Simcock & Hayne, 2002).
As noted, previous research with school-age children (Baker-Ward, Hess,
& Flannigan, 1999;Millward et al., 2000) suggests that cognitive aspects of self-
reference can encroach on the SPT effect. To determine if this also occurs
for preschool children, we included some cognitive cues to self-reference.
Actions were modeled by a cartoon peer, either a little boy or a little girl.
Concepts of own gender and age group are among the first aspects of self-
knowledge expressed (Stipek et al., 1990). To stimulate identification with
gender-matched peers, this character was given the same name as the child.
This explicit label provides one of the simplest entry points to activate self-
recognition. Not only is one’s own name highly (if not uniquely) familiar, it
is also inextricably linked, postobjective self-awareness, with the idea of “me.”
When physically involved in an event, 5-year-olds have been shown to
maintain self-bias in event memory up to 3 weeks later (Baker-Ward et al.,
1990). If preschoolers could also maintain an SRE or SPT effect in long-term
memory, this would strengthen the theoretical link to the autobiographical
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system. Finding SRE and SPT effects of different magnitudes or onsets in the
same age range would imply that SRE and SPT effects are functionally distinct.
In the current paradigm, as children sometimes perform actions modeled by
the self-referent character, and sometimes by the other-referent character,
cognitive and physical aspects of self-reference are in direct competition. As
a result, we would expect a relatively strong bias for the physical or cognitive
dimension to mask effects in the other dimension. On the contrary, finding
evidence of both effects in both age groups would suggest that a multifaceted
autobiographical system is already established.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants
Forty-five children took part: 23 3-year-olds (M = 37.7 months, SD = 3
months, range = 31–42 months) and 22 4-year-olds (M = 50.9 months, SD =
5.2 months, range = 43–59 months). Ten additional children (6 3-year-olds
and 4 4-year-olds) were excluded due to failure to follow the procedure for
taking turns in action reenactment.
Materials
The experimental stimuli at encoding consisted of an introductory draw-
ing of two preschool children (one male and one female) standing side by
side and facing the viewer, and two sets of 18 A6 action cards (including 2
practice cards) depicting these children performing an action. In each set,
half of the actions were depicted by the boy and half by the girl. The actions
depicted by each character were counterbalanced across sets.4 At retrieval,
one of two sets of 16 A4 recognition cards was used, selected to match the
action cards used at encoding. Each recognition card depicted four actions
(of the same type) performed by the same actor, one of which had been
introduced at encoding. All actions were comparably simple to perform and
familiar to preschool children. Examples of the stimuli used are shown in
Figure 1.
Procedure
In thefirst session, childrenwere introduced to the two cartoon characters
on the introductory card (order counterbalanced). The default names of the
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Figure 1.—Examples of Experiment 1 encoding and retrieval stimuli.
characters were Mary and Bob. However, children were routinely told that
the character of their own gender shared their own name. So, for example,
for a child named Louisa, the first session would commence: “Today we’re
going to see Louisa and Bob do lots of different things then we’re going to
take turns acting just like them.” To ensure they understood the procedure,
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children were shown two practice action cards and instructed: “Let’s have
a practice. Here is Louisa clapping, and here is Bob standing on one leg. I
am going to clap my hands, just like Louisa (perform action). Can you stand
on one leg just like Bob?” (or vice versa). Having successfully completed this
practice phase, children were praised and reminded only to perform actions
when prompted by the experimenter. As noted, children were excluded if
they failed to follow this instruction.
In the encoding phase, children were presented with action cards one at
a time in random order: “Look! In this picture name is description of action,” and
instructed either to perform the modeled action or watch the experimenter
perform it. The procedure was counterbalanced so that child and experi-
menter each performed half of the actions modeled by the male child and
half by the female child. When all of the action cards had been presented, the
children were praised for their participation and given a sticker as a reward.
One week later, children were reintroduced to the drawings of the actors
and reminded of the previous session: “Do you remember last time I was here
and we met a little girl called Louisa and a little boy called Bob? Can you
remember any of the things we saw them do last time?” After responding to
this free recall question, children were told that they were going to be shown
some drawings to help them remember more about the previous session. A
total of 16 recognition cards were introduced one at a time in random order.
As noted, each recognition card showed one of the actors performing four
actions, one of which had been presented at the previous session. After each
of the actions on the recognition card was described briefly, the child was
asked “Can you remember which of these things we saw X doing last time?”
When all of the recognition cards had been presented, the children were
again praised and given a sticker as a reward.
Analysis
One-sample t tests were used to determine if recognition memory was
above chance. A two-level (actor and performance) two-factor (self-related
vs. other-related) repeated-measures ANOVA with age group as a between-
subjects variable was used to explore recognition memory.
Results
Recall
Only seven children (all 4 years old) spontaneously reported any of
the 16 target actions from the encoding session. Of the children reporting
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explicit memories of the previous session, four recalled two of the 16 tar-
get actions and three recalled only one. The low incidence of action recall
precludes statistical analysis; however, of the 11 actions recalled, the major-
ity (7) were self-related on both encoding dimensions (performance and
model).
Recognition
As shown in Table 1, recognition performance was significantly above
chance overall for both age groups and on all encoding dimensions.
Age significantly affected the total number of actions recognized, F (1,
43) = 9.5, p = .03, ηp2 = 0.18. Specifically, 4-year-olds recognized more target
actions than did 3-year-olds. There was a significant mnemonic advantage for
both self-performed actions, F (1, 43) = 7.2, p = .011, ηp2 = 0.15, and actions
modeled by a self-referent actor, F (1, 43) = 4.96, p = .031, ηp2 = 0.11. These
medium effect sizes are similar to the typical effect size found in Symons
and Johnson’s (1997) meta-analysis of SRE effects. Neither self-related bias
interacted with age.
TABLE 1
Experiment 1 Recognition Performance Split by Age Group and Encoding Dimension
Age Group
Recognition Overall 3-Year-Old 4-Year-Old
Overall M = 7.3 (46%),
SD = 3.4
M = 5.9 (37%),
SD = 2.9
M = 8.8 (55%),
SD = 3.3
(t(44) = 6.4, p < .001) (t (22)= 3.1, p= .005) (t(21) = 6.7, p < .001)
Self-performed M = 4 (50%),
SD = 2.1
M = 3.2 (40%),
SD = 1.7
M = 4.9 (61%),
SD = 2.1
(t (44)= 6.5, p < .001) (t (22)= 3.2, p= .004) (t(21) = 6.5, p < .001)
Other-performed M = 3.2 (40%),
SD = 1.8
M = 2.7 (34%),
SD = 1.6
M = 3.9 (49%),
SD = 1.8
(t (44)= 4.7, p < .001) (t (22) = 2.1, p = .04) (t (21)= 4.7, p < .001)
Model self-referent M = 3.9(49%),
SD = 2
M = 3.2 (40%),
SD = 1.7
M = 4.7 (59%),
SD = 2.1
(t (44)= 6.3, p < .001) (t (22) = 2.3, p = .04) (t (21)= 6.1, p < .001)
Model other-referent M = 3.4(42%),
SD = 1.75
M = 2.7 (34%),
SD = 1.5
M = 4.1 (51%),
SD = 2.6
(t (44)= 5.3, p < .001) (t (22)= 2.2, p= .035) (t (21)= 5.8, p < .001)
Note.—No children performed at ceiling.
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Discussion
Experiment 1 provides evidence of amnemonic advantage for self-related
material in preschool children. Three- and 4-year-old children showed a sig-
nificant bias for recognizing stimuli that were related physically (through
performance) or cognitively (through nominal/gender matching) to them-
selves at encoding. This confirms that both SRE and SPT effects have an earlier
onset than suggested by previous research (Baker-Ward et al., 1990; Bennett
& Sani, 2008; Millward et al., 2000; Pullyblank et al., 1985; Sui & Zhu, 2005;
Summers & Craik, 1994). As noted, if the SPT effect was based entirely on
subjective feedback, then one might expect it to precede the “objective” SRE
in ontogeny. However, Experiment 1 found SPT and SRE effects of equivalent
magnitude, with no significant developmental progression. It is notable that
both effects emerged despite being pitted against one another (the cognitive
SRE controlled for physical self-reference and vice versa). This result fits with
previous research suggesting that SRE and SPT effects have somemechanistic
overlap (Baker-Ward, Hess, & Flannigan, 1999; Millward et al., 2000).
The current paradigm evidently has high memory demands. Within this
sample, none of the younger preschoolers offered free recall of the event.
However, the introduction of picture recognition tests provided a useful sup-
port. Although there was developmental progression in recognition memory,
both 3- and 4-year-olds were above chance in reporting memories of encod-
ing using this measure. In addition to reducing the delay between encoding
and retrieval, one way to reduce the mnemonic demands of this paradigm
would be to reintroduce objects involved in actions at encoding, as opposed to
actor-object models. This would reduce the visual complexity of the recogni-
tion tests and, more important, as objects are more easily labeled than action
statements, ease the linguistic demands of free recall. This method gave Sum-
mers and Craik (1994) a positive result for 5-year-old children and is adopted
in the remaining experiments reported in this volume.5
An alternative way to simplify the actor-object model, particularly impor-
tant for tests of cognitive SREs, would be to use a less ambiguous self-referent
actor. Although children as young as 2 years recognize themselves in pho-
tographs, the understanding of drawings as representations emerges later,
sometime between the 3rd and 4th year (Zelazo, Sommerville, & Nichols,
1999). As a result, we might question whether children identified with the
to-be-remembered cartoon representation in Experiment 1. Rather, the SRE
found may have been based on the novelty of being presented with a cartoon
counterpart. Where actors and objects are represented separately, this prob-
lem can easily be avoided by representing self- and other-referent actors using
a recently taken photograph. Accordingly, Experiments 3, 4, and 5 use instant
Polaroid images of self and other to create self- and other-referent contexts
at encoding.6
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In addition to highlighting these design problems, the clearest limita-
tion of Experiment 1 is that it permits no comment on children’s explicit
reference to the self in the past. As we included no measure of source mon-
itoring, it remains possible that the role of the self in memory is not open
to conscious reflection for preschool children. Using the current paradigm,
it might have been possible to gather data on explicit awareness of the past
self by asking children to report at retrieval which actor modeled an ac-
tion or who performed it. However, asking children to source-monitor on
both physical and cognitive dimensions would arguably be overly demand-
ing (“I performed it but he modelled it.”). Advantageously, as a result of
separating actors and to-be-remembered objects, and the introduction of un-
ambiguous people representations, the following experiments are amenable
to self-other source-monitoring checks (e.g., “Was X presented with your pho-
tograph?”). By asking children to recall contextual information concerning
the self at encoding, this form of source monitoring allows us to determine
whether preschool children canmake explicit reference to the self in episodic
memory.
Finally, in the following chapters, although preserving an “action”
paradigm, we move away from kinesthetic contributions to self-reference. Al-
though we remain interested in the contribution of physical self-involvement
to self-referent memories, this experiment suffices to confirm that such a
contribution occurs and therefore must be controlled for if seeking to find
a “purely” cognitive SRE of the sort reported in adult populations. We have
previously commented on thewisdomof dissecting the self permanently.How-
ever, it is clear that cognitive self-awareness and basic kinesthetic awareness
(agency) are both ontogenetically and phylogenetically distinct. Detection of
agency appears to be innate in humans. In Chapter I, we reviewed a number of
studies suggesting that newborn infants are sensitive to contingency between
themselves and the environment prior to mirror self-recognition (Bahrick &
Watson, 1985; Field, 1979; Legerstee et al., 1998; Lewis and Brooks-Gunn,
1979; Rochat & Striano, 2002). Research with nonhumans also suggests that
agency detection is present in many species that do not show mirror self-
recognition (see Mitchell, 2002, for an interesting discussion). This implies
that the SPT effect may operate, at least partially, at an implicit level. For
this reason, to focus on pinpointing the functional specialization of explicit
self-recognition, it seems prudent to put kinesthetic agency temporarily aside.
NOTES
4. An equal number of depicted actions could be categorized as self-directed (acts on
self, with or without object), other-directed (actions directed away from self, with or without
object), and actions with or without an imaginary object. Post hoc, these action categories
appeared to have no influence on performance and so are not discussed in detail.
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5. Another apparently simple way to support perceptual memory might have been to
introduce reenactment of the action sequences at recall and recognition. Preschool children
are capable of reenacting more actions from a previous activity than they can express verbally
(Ratner, Foley, & McCaskill, 2001; Smith, Ratner, & Hobart, 1987). However, asking the
children to enact actions at retrieval would introduce a cuing bias for self-performed actions.
Only these actions would be experienced in the samemode (action) at encoding and retrieval;
that is, only the target item would constitute reenactment. Even at recall, the instruction “show
me an action from last time” is likely to preferentially cue actions that were previously “shown”
by the child. For this reason, although reenactment is likely to prove useful in assessing the
importance of the subjective aspect of the SPT effect (see Mulligan & Horstein 1999), it is
unsuited to establishing its natural occurrence.
6. Although unambiguously self-referent, own names and photographs are also highly
familiar, and likely to be attention grabbing. Further discussion of top-down, attention-based
SREs is provided in Chapters III and V.
24
III. THE IMPACT OF VISUAL-COGNITIVE SELF-REFERENCE
ON PRESCHOOLERS’ MEMORY FOR ACTION OBJECTS
In this chapter, we report three experiments in which the physical compo-
nent of action encoding used in Experiment 1 is replaced with visual-cognitive
processing tasks. Although making no reference to the SPT effect, Sui and
Zhu’s (2005) developmental SRE paradigm innovatively combines physical
and cognitive aspects of self-reference. As noted, those authors asked children
to recognize an external self-representation linked via a pointing gesture to to-
be-remembered objects. The advantage of this procedure is that it exploits the
simple and memorable nature of physical self-involvement, while requiring
children to process stimuli on a cognitive basis. Moreover, during encoding
and at retrieval, Sui and Zhu (2005) asked the children to monitor which
actor (self or other) pointed to an object. This simple judgment is important
as it confirms that the link between self and object is available on an explicit
level. Interestingly, given their failure to find an SRE for 4-year-olds, Sui and
Zhu (2005) found that 4-, 5-, and 10-year-old children were similarly equipped
to differentiate between self and other in memory. For the objects they did
recall, each age group showed a success rate of around 70% in reporting the
actor with whom they were associated.
Success in this aspect of the task is in line with previous research sug-
gesting that young children can monitor whether events were self- or other-
produced. For example, Foley, Johnson, and Raye (1983) found that 6-year-
olds were as accurate as adults in distinguishing whether they had spoken
a word, or if it had been spoken by another person. Extending these re-
sults, Sui and Zhu (2005) demonstrated that 4-year-olds can explicitly en-
code information differentiating between the roles of self and other on a
visual-cognitive basis. Implying that SREsmay rely on explicit self-recognition,
some researchers have found that children with autism are impaired in self-
other source monitoring (Hala, Rasmussen, & Henderson, 2005; Russell &
Jarrold, 1999). However, as the 4-year-olds’ performance in self-other source-
monitoring was equivalent to that of older age groups in Sui and Zhu’s (2005)
study, this factor cannot explain why they failed to show an SRE.
Interpreting this failure, Sui and Zhu (2005) suggest that despite
their ability to self-conserve, younger children’s self-concepts may be
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underdeveloped relative to older children’s. As a result, the association of
to-be-remembered stimuli with the younger children’s self-concepts is in-
adequate to induce a bias at retrieval. This conclusion is in line with our
suggestion that the SRE paradigm has the potential to index developmental
change in the cognitive elaboration of the self-concept. However, Sui and Zhu
(2005) went on to conclude that the self has no functional role in memory
for younger children. This conclusion does not necessarily follow. Although
tagging objects as self-referent was yet to be of mnemonic benefit, the self-
concept nonetheless had a mnemonic impact in differentiating the material,
that is, it had a function. Moreover, Experiment 1 shows that in other con-
ditions, preschool children can show a bias in memory for events associated
with the self-concept.
It is possible that the difference between the findings of Experiment 1
and Sui and Zhu’s (2005) results is due to the higher task demands of our
experiment. The external self-representation used in Experiment 1 was not
a direct reflection of the child, meaning that any association between the
self-concept and to-be-remembered stimuli required cognitive mediation. It
is perhaps counterintuitive that this more complex level of self-recognition
should allow 4-year-olds to index an SRE, whereas Sui and Zhu’s (2005) sim-
pler procedure did not. However, Sui and Zhu’s (2005) task relied onmaking
explicit a visual link between self and stimuli, whereas Experiment 1 required
that the link between self and stimuli be actively constructed. This occurred ei-
ther via physical involvement or cognitive interpretation of otherwise neutral
stimuli as self-related. For this reason, Experiment 1 may have elicited deeper
self-referent processing than Sui and Zhu’s (2005) task. One interpretation
then, is that to elicit an effect one must ensure that younger children actively
elaborate the link between self and to-be-remembered stimuli. Without this,
any link made may be too weak to be of cognitive benefit.
An alternative explanation for the disparity between our results and Sui
and Zhu’s (2005) findings focuses on the specific task demands of their
study. Although the association between self and stimuli in Sui and Zhu’s
(2005) study appeared simple, their method for ensuring children encoded
this information was not. First, they used hybrid stimuli for self-recognition,
digitally placing children’s heads on a generic pointing body. Although the
children were evidently able to correctly differentiate between self and other
in declarative memory, it is a peculiarity of Sui and Zhu’s (2005) procedure
that representation of the pointing action was divorced from the actor in-
volved. This may have compromised self-other differentiation on an implicit
level. Moreover, this problem might have been particularly pronounced for
the younger children, whose understanding of external representations is rel-
atively new (Zelazo et al., 1999). Of further detriment to implicit self-other
differentiation, Sui and Zhu (2005) used the image of an unfamiliar other
of the same age and gender as the child. However, Experiment 1 showed
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that observable similarities between self and other sometimes led preschool
children to show a mnemonic bias for “other”-referent stimuli.
The complexity of Sui and Zhu’s (2005) presentation schedule is also
open to criticism. At encoding, representations of actor and object were pre-
sented on screen for just 4 s before the display disappeared to be replaced
by a source-monitoring prompt. During the prompt (which was displayed
for an unlimited time), the child was encouraged to state the sentence “I
am” or “Other is” “pointing to the object.”7 These minitests of declarative
memory served to emphasize the link between actors and objects, and were
presumably designed to support the encoding of expressible memories. Con-
sequently, children spent most of their time not experiencing the impact of
self-recognition, but recreating this experience verbally. For developing lin-
guists in particular, theseminitestsmight have distracted from continued elab-
oration on a deeper level. The cognitive correlates of visual self-recognition
are presumably activatedmost strongly during the recognition event, not after
it.
Sui and Zhu (2005) justify their separation of visual and linguistic pro-
cessing by noting that children cannot be expected to respond on a strict
schedule. However, they do not discuss their motivation for using a fixed
interval to present visual stimuli. Their use of a shorter interval in the second
study, which aimed to increase task difficulty for 10-year-olds, implies that this
factor was intended to make the task sufficiently challenging to allow an SRE.
In Symons and Johnson’s (1997) meta-analysis, short presentation times were
found to increase SREs. However, as discussed, brief presentation time in this
paradigmmight reduce the cognitive impact of self-recognition. It is also pos-
sible that the fixed interval was introduced to ensure that children spent an
equivalent amount of time exposed to self- and other-referent stimuli. Symons
and Johnson (1997) did not flag within-task timing as an issue in studies of
the SRE in adults. Further, our own comparison of studies with (N = 28) and
without (N = 41) fixed interval presentation times in Symons and Johnson’s
(1997) meta-analysis suggests that this factor does not dictate whether an ef-
fect occurs. However, as with the picture stimuli used in Experiment 1,8 the
word stimuli used in these studies were objectively self-neutral. By contrast,
Sui and Zhu’s (2005) stimulus-object pairs were transparently self-referent.
For this reason, Sui and Zhu (2005) might have considered it important to
control for the amount of time allowed to make simple visual associations.
However, even if stimuli were presented on a schedule dictated by re-
sponses, it is unclear how a selective time bias would emerge, particularly
in the direction needed to support an SRE. The most likely scenario is ar-
guably that self-interest would lead to fast responding to self-referent ques-
tions, which would undermine any time-driven SRE. If self-interest led to
slow responding due to distraction, failing to focus on the link between
self and stimuli (the response required) would also undermine the SRE. If
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preschoolers chose to withhold answers to the self-referent question not be-
cause they were unsure of them but because of a desire to prolong exposure,
they would be showing an unlikely amount of Machiavellian control. In any
event, the motivation to linger over stimuli presented with the self-image
would remain indicative of higher level self-recognition. Moreover, to confer
mnemonic benefit, extra processing time must refer not only to the self but
also to the to-be-remembered object. At the very least then, concurrent activa-
tion of the object-concept and self-concept would be central to themnemonic
bias. It would be difficult to argue that this was not an SRE.
EXPERIMENT 2
Sui and Zhu’s (2005) approach is of particular interest as it identifies
an unambiguous aspect of self-reference that might be used to trace the on-
togeny of the SRE, and to assess explicit self-monitoring in event memory. It
is clear that 3- and 4-year-olds recognize their self-image. What is not clear is
whether the cognitive correlates of visual self-recognition are strong enough
to play a supportive role in memory. Having identified some complexities
in Sui and Zhu (2005) procedure, Experiment 2 aims to determine if the
paradigm can be adapted to allow younger children to show an SRE. Address-
ing concerns about a possible recognition overlap between self and other,
Experiment 4 substituted Sui and Zhu’s (2005) same-gender peer photograph
with a photograph of the experimenter. To avoid ambiguity concerning ac-
tion ownership, full body shots of self and experimenter pointing were used.
Crucially, children were asked to judge who was pointing to the object during
stimulus pair presentation. Here, the linguistically simple response “I am” or
“You are,” or even a gesture toward the appropriate person was sufficient.
When children made a response, the stimulus pair was removed. Finally, as
in Experiment 1, the recall test was supplemented by a recognition mea-
sure designed to support the children’s reporting of visual memories of the
event.
Sui and Zhu’s (2005) use of a very short interval between encoding and
retrieval is typical of the SRE paradigm and is replicated here. Given that a
primary aim of these experiments is to provide the first evidence of an SRE
in preschool children, it is unnecessary to require children to demonstrate
the SRE over a substantial delay (as in Experiment 1). Moreover, large delays
are likely to be particularly challenging without the support of physical in-
volvement in the event, as used in previous long-delay research (Baker-Ward
et al., 1990). In any case, according to the currently held SRE model, stimuli
that are recognized as self-referent at encoding are linked to the self-concept.
This greater depth of processing results in the stimuli becoming relatively
easy to retrieve. Encoding specificity (the self is present at both encoding
28
THE IMPACT OF VISUAL-COGNITIVE SELF-REFERENCE ON PRESCHOOLERS’ MEMORY
and retrieval) may also contribute. However, the initial recognition of stimuli
as self-referent is at the root of the effect. Likewise, the initial encoding of
stimuli as self-referent is presumably the first step in autobiographical pro-
cessing. For this reason, although future research could usefully address the
impact of increasing delay on the SRE in adults and preschoolers (see also
Experiments 6 and 7 in this volume), Experiments 2, 3, and 4 are committed
only to replicating the effect with the typical delay.
Method
Participants
Sixty preschool children took part: thirty 3-year-olds (M = 38.6 months,
SD = 1.9 months, range = 35–42 months) and thirty 4-year-olds (M = 49.4
months, SD = 4.2 months, range = 44–57 months).
Materials
During encoding, one of two Polaroid photographs was placed on A4
sheets of paper on a target approximately one inch from an object outline
picture. Photograph and objects were arranged so that the person in the
picture (child or experimenter) appeared to be pointing at the object (see,
e.g., Figure 3).Ten sheets, each featuring a different object, were presented,
five withself-image and five with other-image. As in Sui and Zhu’s (2005) study,
object outline pictures were taken from a set standardized for familiarity by
Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980). A4 recognition cards consisted of one
target object and three distracter objects (see Figure 2). Three paper cups and
a toy-shopping trolley were used in a distracter activity separating encoding
from retrieval.
Procedure
Children were shown a Polaroid image of the experimenter pointing,
after which they were asked to adopt a pointing pose and had their own
Polaroid photograph taken. In the encoding phase, 10 object outlines were
shown one at a time with one of the Polaroid images held adjacent (order
counterbalanced). Sui and Zhu (2005) used 12 object pictures, but piloting
suggested that 10 was a more appropriate number of stimuli for this younger
sample. During each stimulus-pair presentation, the experimenter pointed to
the object and said “What is that?”, and the child typically answered with the
29
Figure 2.—Examples of Experiment 2 encoding and retrieval stimuli.
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Figure 3.—Examples of Experiment 3 encoding stimuli.
object name (if they did not, the experimenter named the said “it’s an X [e.g.,
ball], isn’t it?”). The experimenter then pointed to the adjacent photograph
and said “Who is pointing to the X?” The target response was “I am” or
“You are,” or a gesture toward the appropriate person. If the child refused to
respond, the experimenter said “You are/I am pointing to the object,” while
gesturing to the appropriate person, and then moved on.
Following encoding of all 10 objects, the child participated in a 2-min-long
distracter activity involving hiding a toy from the experimenter under one of
three cups. Sui and Zhu (2005) did not provide details of their distracter
task, but the present activity was of similar duration and unrelated to the
picture game. After the interval, the child was reminded of the previous game
(verbally, and via reintroduction of the photographs) and asked to recall
the object pictures shown. For each object correctly recalled, the child was
asked the explicit source-monitoring question “Who pointed to the X?” This
time the target response was “I did” or “You did,” or a gesture toward the
appropriate person or photograph (both were present). Children were then
given a recognition test for each object. Recognition cards showed objects
from the previous display together with three distracters (placement on card
counterbalanced). The experimenter named each object on the card and said
“I only showed you one of these pictures, can you remember which one?”.
Again, for each object correctly recognized, the child was asked “Who pointed
to the X?”, target responses were as for the recall test. At the end of the game,
children were given their own photograph to keep as a reward for taking
part.
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Analysis
One-sample t tests were used to determine if recognition memory and
source-monitoring judgments were above chance. A univariate ANOVA with
age group as a between-subjects factor was used to assess the impact of age on
source-monitoring accuracy for recognized stimuli. A two-factor (self-referent
vs. other-referent) repeated-measures ANOVA with age group as a between-
subjects variable was used to explore recognition memory.
Results
Recall
Only 15 children (three 3-year-olds and twelve 4-year-olds) offered free
recall, recalling an average of 2.2 objects (SD = 1.4). At an average of 69.4%
(SD = 40%) correct source-monitoring judgments for recalled stimuli, per-
formance narrowly failed to significantly exceed chance, t(14) = 1.8, p = .08.
The low incidence of recall precludes statistical analysis. However, of the 33
stimuli recalled, 15 were self-referent and 18 were other-referent.
Recognition
As shown in Table 2, recognition performance was significantly above
chance overall, for both self- and other-referent stimuli, and for both age-
groups.
Age had no effect on overall recognition rates. Within the task, children
recognized a similar number of self- and other-referent stimuli. However, this
factor interacted with age, F(1, 58) = 6.6, p = .012, ηp2 = 0.1. To investigate
TABLE 2
Experiment 2 Recognition Performance Split by Age Group and Encoding Dimension
Age Group
Recognition Overall 3-Year-Old 4-Year-Old
Overall M = 5.3 (53%), SD = 2.9 M = 4.8 (48%), SD = 2.8 M = 5.8 (58%), SD = 2.9
(t(59) = 7.4, p < .001) (t(29) = 4.3, p < .001) (t(29) = 6.2, p < .001)
Self-referent M = 2.5 (50%), SD = 1.6 M = 2.5 (50%), SD = 1.6 M = 2.6 (52%), SD = 1.6
(t(59) = 6.2, p < .001) (t(29) = 4.1, p < .001) (t(29) = 4.7, p = .001)
Other-referent M = 2.7 (54%), SD = 1.6 M = 2.3 (46%), SD = 1.4 M = 3.2 (64%), SD = 1.6
(t(59) = 7.3, p < .001) (t(29) = 4, p < .001) (t(29) = 6.7, p < .001)
Note.—Five 3.5- to 4-year-olds performed at ceiling, recognizing all 10 stimuli.
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further, the file was split according to age group and the ANOVA repeated
with no between-subjects variable. As shown in Table 2, whereas 3-year-olds
recognized a similar number of self- and other-related objects, 4-year-olds
showed a strong bias for recognition of other-related objects, F(1, 28) = 7.5,
p = .011, ηp2 = 0.2.
Children made correct source-monitoring judgments for an above-
chance average of 61.5% (SD = 29%) of recognized stimuli, t(58) = 3, p =
.004. Although the effect of age on the percentage of correct source monitor-
ing failed to reach significance, F(1, 55) = 3.2, p = .08, ηp2 = 0.05, one-sample
t tests indicated that whereas 3-year-olds did not significantly differ from
chance in monitoring the source of recognized stimuli at 55%, 4-year-olds
were above chance at 68% (SD = 24%, t(29) = 4, p < .01).
Discussion
Four-year-olds performed above chance in monitoring who had pointed
to recognized objects, confirming that this age group is capable of explicitly
differentiating between self and other in memory. However, 4-year-olds did
not recognize self-referent stimuli more often than other-referent stimuli at
retrieval. Just as in Sui and Zhu’s (2005) recall data, they showed a bias in
the opposite direction, recognizing more stimuli associated with the image
of an unfamiliar other. Moreover, in this experiment, 4-year-olds’ mnemonic
bias for other-referent stimuli was significant. The results for 3-year-olds are
also negative. Here, 3-year-olds failed to show a significant SRE, despite the
shorter interval between encoding and retrieval. Further, children of this age
were below chance inmonitoring the source of the stimuli they did recognize.
The replication of Sui and Zhu’s (2005) other-reference effect (ORE)
confirms that 4-year-olds’ failure to index an SREwas not due to those authors’
use of a similar other or generic representation of the pointing action. Even
when given the opportunity to focus for longer on self-referent stimuli, 4-year-
olds showed no SRE. However, children showed the same pattern here where
exposure to photographs was longer, as in Sui and Zhu’s (2005) study, where
they were presented for only a few seconds. This refutes the suggestion that
the fixed interval schedule might have been overly demanding for 4-year-olds.
Nevertheless, discovery of a significant ORE challenges Sui and Zhu’s (2005)
conclusion that 4-year-olds failed to show an SRE due to a relatively weak self-
concept. There is no reason to expect that 4-year-olds’ concepts of unfamiliar
others should be superior to their own, albeit early, self-concepts.
A more plausible explanation for the ORE can be derived from previ-
ous discussion of self-focus. As noted, one reason to include a fixed interval
stimulus presentation schedule is to control for self-interest as a mediating
factor in a visual-cognitive SRE. However, in addition to a possible impact on
the time spent encoding self- versus other-referent stimuli, self-focus might
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have an impact within stimulus presentations. Specifically, photographs were
presented separately from to-be-remembered objects in the visual field, and
the integration between the two was relatively passive (pointing). For this
reason, it seems plausible that self-photographs sometimes distracted from,
rather than drew attention toward, task stimuli. Clearly, this could result in a
reversed self-reference effect. This might also explain why the expected age-
related recognition advantage emerged only for other-referent stimuli. Only
here could 4-year-olds encode stimulus-object pairs without distraction.
EXPERIMENT 3
Following the above reasoning, Experiment 3 introduced two SRE
paradigms in which the impact of visual self-focus was controlled. The first
aimed to more clearly integrate to-be-remembered stimuli with representa-
tions of self and other. To achieve this, objects were placed upon, rather than
adjacent to, person photographs. The objects were chosen to give the impres-
sion of an action. For example, a cut out tennis racket placed upon a figure
in a photograph gives the impression that the figure is playing tennis. Placing
to-be-remembered objects in the same visual field as the self was expected
to minimize any interference arising from self-focus. Moreover, it seemed
likely that the elaborated link between people and objects would result in a
greater depth of processing. Experiment 1 suggested that active processing
might help young children to show an SRE. To ensure that children actively
interpreted the link between people and objects, they were asked to give a
verbal description of actor and action (e.g., “I played tennis”) during stimulus
presentation. This additional support was expected to facilitate 3-year-olds’
source monitoring, improving the possibility of an SRE for this age group.
Rather than integrate self- and object-representations, the second
paradigm returned to the use of self-neutral stimuli. Here, objects were pre-
sented with a verbal action description only. Crucially, each description began
with linguistic reference to self (“I”) or other (“He/She”). To compensate for
the paucity of these presentations, descriptions no longer focused on the
generic “played with” but described specific actions, for example “I stroked
the cat.” First-person pronouns are reflexive, meaning that depending on
the context of their production, they may refer to self or other. As such,
“I” does not yield an attention or familiarity advantage over “you,” “he,” or
“she” in the way that one’s own name (Experiment 1) or own photograph
(Experiment 2) might yield an advantage over less-familiar names or images.
However, this theoretical advantage has practical implications. As the chil-
dren were not of reading age, action statements had to be presented verbally
in the pronoun-based task. This meant that the first-person pronoun used in
action statements could be interpreted as referring to the speaker (an other)
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as opposed to the listener. For this reason, children were required to repeat
action statements, in other words, to verbally take the perspective of “I.” To
address the possibility that action statement repetition might not be sufficient
to prompt children take the cognitive perspective of “I” a second variable
was introduced to promote self-referent processing: specifically, half of the
children were exposed to their mirror image during encoding.
In adults, the introduction of a mirror has been shown to result in an
increased tendency to interpret ambiguous language as self-referent (Davis &
Brock, 1975; Stapel & Tesser, 2001). This raises the possibility that a mirror
may encourage children to interpret the first-person pronoun employed in
Experiment 3 as self-referent, thus promoting an SRE. Even in the photo-
based version of the task, where first-person pronouns are disambiguated, it
seems possible that any increased activation of the self-concept resulting from
mirror exposure would facilitate an SRE. For this reason, the introduction of a
mirror to the SRE paradigm might be expected to help children, particularly
the youngest age group, index an effect.
Method
Participants
In total, 120 preschool children took part: sixty 3-year-olds (M = 38.5
months, SD = 2.3 months, range = 34–42 months) and sixty 4-year-olds (M =
49.5 months, SD = 4.4 months, range = 43–59 months). Half of the children
from each age group completed the photo-action task and half the pronoun-
action task (total N per task = 60).
Materials
Stimuli for the photo-action task included three Polaroid photographs
(one of the child, one male child, and one female peer) and 10 cutout object
outlines as described for Experiment 2. Stimuli for the pronoun-action task
were the same 10 object outline pictures, this time accompanied by an action
statement to be read out by the experimenter. See Figure 3 for examples of
photo-action and pronoun-action encoding stimuli. A mirror (6′′ × 6′′) was
also used at encoding to manipulate self-awareness. As described for Experi-
ment 2, recognition stimuli for both tasks comprised 10 A4 recognition cards
including one target object and three previously unencountered objects. Ma-
terials and procedure for the distracter task were as described in Experiment
2.
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Procedure
Children participating in the photo-action task were shown a Polaroid
photograph of a child of the opposite gender, then had their own photograph
taken. For half of the children, a mirror was present and angled to reflect the
child’s face (high self-awareness condition). For the remainder, the mirror’s
nonreflective surface was presented (low self-awareness condition). Those in
the high self-awareness condition had their attention drawn to their mirror
image while waiting for the photograph to develop (“Can you see yourself in
mymirror? Is that what your photographwill look like?”). Children were asked
to self-recognize in the photograph, which was then shown with a series of
stimulus-pair presentations. During the presentation, each object was placed
upon one of the Polaroid images (order counterbalanced), and the child was
asked “What’s that?” and “Who is playing with the X?” Upon response, the
experimenter prompted “So you say, I (He/She) am (is) playing with the X”
and encouraged the child to repeat the sentence.
Photographs of unfamiliar opposite-gender peers replaced the experi-
menter’s image in this paradigm to avoid confusion arising from the reflexive
nature of personal pronouns (“I” becomes “You”). Contrary to Sui and Zhu
(2005), an opposite-gender peer was used, intended to maximize differentia-
tion between self and other. As described in Experiment 2, following a short
distracter activity, the child was reminded of the previous game and asked to
recall, recognize, and source monitor for the object pictures shown. The mir-
ror was not present at retrieval in order to avoid any bias in cuing self-referent
information. Again, children were given their own photograph to keep at the
end of the game as a reward for participation.
Children participating in the pronoun-action task were presented with
the same object pictures. Again, children in the mirror condition were en-
couraged to attend to their reflection before the task began. In this task, as
each object was shown, the experimenter made a simple action statement
involving the object and the first-person pronoun “I” or an opposite-gender
referent pronoun (e.g., “I/He bounced the ball”). Here, the generic “played
with” was not used to describe actions as, in the absence of photographs,
this might not result in sufficient differentiation between encoding stimuli.
Following the short distracter task, the child was reminded of the previous
game and asked to recall and recognize the object pictures shown as described
in Experiment 2 (again the mirror was now absent). In pilot work, children
failed to respond to the simplest framing of the source-monitoring question,
for example, “What did we say about the ball?” or “Who bounced the ball?”
For this reason, source-monitoring questions were not asked for the pronoun-
action task. At the end of the game, children were given a sticker as a reward
for taking part.
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Analysis
One-sample t tests were used to determine if recognition memory and
source-monitoring judgments in the photo-action task were above chance. A
univariate ANOVA was used to assess the impact of age and self-awareness
condition on source monitoring for recognized stimuli in the photo-action
task. Performance here was compared to source-monitoring performance in
Experiment 2 using an independent samples t test. A two-level (recall and
recognition) two-factor (self-referent vs. other-referent) repeated-measures
ANOVA with age group, task type, and self-awareness condition as between-
subjects factors was used to explore memory performance. To get a clearer
picture of what was going on within each task (allowing neater comparison
of this data with previous results), repeated-measures ANOVA with age and
self-awareness condition as between-subjects variables were also run separately
on recognition scores for each task type.
Results
Recall
Fifty children (eighteen 3-year-olds and thirty-two 4-year-olds) offered
free recall, recalling an average of 2.9 objects (SD = 1.4). Age had a main
effect on overall recall scores, F(1, 112) = 10.4, p = .002, ηp2 = 0.08, with
4-year-olds (M = 1.7, SD = 1.4) outperforming 3-year-olds (M = 0.8, SD =
1.9). There was no recall advantage for either task type (photo-action task:
M = 1.1, SD = 1.6; pronoun-action task: M = 1.3, SD = 1.8) or self-awareness
condition (mirror present: M = 1.2, SD = 1.6; mirror absent: M = 1.4, SD =
1.8). Moreover, children showed no recall advantage for self- (M = 0.6,
SD = 0.9) over other-related (M = 0.6, SD = 1) stimuli, regardless of age-
group, task type, or self-awareness condition.
Source monitoring for those offering free recall in the photo-action task
was remarkably high at 97.5% (SD = 8%) correct, t(24) = 27.9, p < .01.
However, the relatively small number offering free recall precluded statisti-
cal assessment of the effects of age and self-awareness condition on source-
monitoring performance.
Recognition
As shown in Table 3, recognition was above chance for both tasks, for
both age groups, and self-awareness conditions.
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Age had a significant effect on the number of stimuli recognized, F(1,
112) = 6.7, p = .01, ηp2 = 0.06, with 4-year-olds outperforming 3-year-olds.
Recognition memory appeared more robust in the photo-action task, and
the between-subjects effect of task type approached significance, F(1, 112) =
3.6, p = .058, ηp2 = 0.03. There was no effect of self-awareness condition on
recognition scores.
Children showed a significant recognition advantage for self- (M = 3.4,
SD = 0.15) over other-related (M = 3.1, SD = 0.15) stimuli, F(1, 112) =
7.7, p = .006, ηp2 = 0.065, regardless of task type or self-awareness condition.
This SRE interacted with age, F(1, 112) = 5, p = .03, ηp2 = 0.04, such that
3-year-olds showed the largest bias (3-year-olds: self-relatedM = 3.1, SD = 0.2,
other-related M = 2.6, SD = 0.2; 4-year-olds: self-related M = 3.65, SD = 0.2,
other-related M = 3.6, SD = 0.2).
Within the photo-action task, there was no overall recognition advantage
for self-related stimuli; however, there was a significant interaction between
this factor and age, F(1, 56) = 5.6, p = .02, ηp2 = 0.09. As shown in Table 3,
3-year-olds showed a stronger SRE than 4-year-olds. To qualify this, the file was
split according to age group and the analysis repeated without age group as a
between-subjects factor. This analysis showed that whereas 3-year-olds showed
a strong SRE in the photo-action task, F(1, 28) = 8.1, p = .008, ηp2 = 0.2,
4-year-olds failed to show a significant bias in either direction.
Within the pronoun action there was a significant overall advantage for
self-referent stimuli, F(1, 56) = 5.4, p = .02, ηp2 = 0.09, with no interaction
with age or self-awareness condition. However, there was a significant three-
way interaction between the SRE, self-awareness condition, and age, F(1, 56)=
5.4, p = .02, ηp2 = 0.09. To investigate further, the file was again split by age
group and the analysis repeated without age group as a between-subjects
factor. Three-year-olds, F(1, 28) = 5.1, p = .03, ηp2 = 0.15, but not 4-year-
olds showed a significant overall SRE (see Table 3 for means). Moreover, this
bias interacted with self-awareness condition, F(1, 28) = 5.1, p = .03, ηp2 =
0.15. As shown in Figure 4, 3-year-olds showed a bias for stimuli encoded with
first-person pronouns within the task only when the mirror was present at
encoding, F(1, 14) = 16, p = .001, ηp2 = 0.5; when the mirror was absent they
showed no recognition bias.
At an average of 89% (SD = 18.5%) correct, source monitoring for rec-
ognized stimuli in the photo-action task was significantly improved from Ex-
periment 2 (independent sample t test, t(113) = 5.7, p < .01). Moreover,
one-sample t tests indicated that both age groups were now significantly
above chance at monitoring the source of recognized stimuli (3-year-olds:
M = 84%, SD = 24%, t(26) = 7.4, p < .01; 4-year-olds: M = 92%, SD = 11%,
t(28) = 19.8, p < .01). There was no effect of age or self-awareness condition
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Figure 4.—Three-year-olds’ recognition of self- and other-referent stimuli in Experiment
3, split by self-awareness condition.
(mirror present: M = 83%, SD = 22%; mirror absent: M = 92%, SD = 12%)
on source-monitoring performance.
Discussion
Experiment 3 provides new evidence to suggest that children as young
as 3 years show an SRE in memory. Three-year-olds showed greater recogni-
tion of stimuli that had been presented pictorially as part of a self-performed
action. This occurred regardless of mirror-induced self-focus at encoding.
However, children only showed a bias for the recognition of stimuli that
verbally implicated the self when self-focus was primed by the mirror. Both
results indicate that helping 3-year-olds to actively link events with the self at
encoding can facilitate retrieval of those events. However, no SRE was found
for 4-year-olds. A plausible explanation for this lies in older children’s greater
recognition success. Over 40% of the 4-year-olds in both tasks performed at
ceiling when recognizing encoding stimuli. This means that a relatively small
number of 4-year-olds were capable of showing differential recognition of self-
versus other-referent stimuli. By contrast, only 15% of 3-year-olds performed
at ceiling. A similar problem was encountered by Sui and Zhu (2005), who,
although finding an SRE for 5-year-olds in their first experiment, failed to
find an equivalent effect for 10-year-olds. This problem was overcome in their
second experiment by increasing the number of to-be-remembered stimuli.
Following Sui and Zhu’s (2005) reasoning, Experiment 4 aimed to increase
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task demands to increase the likelihood that 4-year-olds would show a signifi-
cant SRE.
EXPERIMENT 4
Method
Participants
Sixty 4-year-olds took part: 30 in the photo-action task (M = 51 months,
SD = 5 months, range = 43–60 months) and 30 in the pronoun-action task
(M = 54.2 months, SD = 6 months, range = 43–63 months).
Materials and Procedure
The materials and procedure were as described for Experiment 3. How-
ever, to increase difficulty, six extra object outline pictures and recognition
cards were now included, bringing the total number of to-be-remembered
stimuli to 16. Again, all object outlines were taken from Snodgrass and Van-
derwart’s (1980) standardized set.
Analysis
One-sample t tests were used to determine if recognition memory and
source-monitoring judgments in the photo-action task were above chance. A
univariate ANOVAwas used to assess the impact of self-awareness condition on
source monitoring for recognized stimuli in the photo-action task. Pearson’s
correlations were run to assess the impact of age on overall recall and recog-
nition rates. A two-level (recall and recognition) two-factor (self-referent vs.
other-referent) repeated-measures ANOVA with task type and self-awareness
condition as between-subjects factors was used to explore memory perfor-
mance. For recognition data, repeated-measures ANOVAs with age and self-
awareness condition as between-subjects variables were also run separately for
each task type. Finally, analysis was run to compare the magnitude of SREs
found for 3- and 4-year-olds in this and the previous experiment, these are
described in full later.
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Results
Recall
Thirty-nine children (M = 54 months) offered free recall, recalling an
average of 2.7 objects (SD = 1.4). Recall scores did not show a significant
correlation with age in months and neither task type (photo-action task:
M = 1.8, SD = 1.6; pronoun-action task:M = 1.7, SD = 1.8) nor self-awareness
condition (mirror present: M = 1.9, SD = 1.9; mirror absent: M = 1.5, SD =
1.5) had significant main effects. There was no recall advantage for self- (M =
0.8, SD = 0.9) over other-referent (M = 0.9, SD = 1.1) stimuli, regardless of
task type, or self-awareness condition.
In the photo-action task, an above-chance average of 87% (SD = 27%) of
source judgments, arising from free recall was correct, t(19) = 5.9, p < .01.
However, the relatively small number offering free recall precluded statisti-
cal assessment of the effects of age and self-awareness condition on source-
monitoring performance.
Recognition
As shown in Table 4, recognition was above chance for both tasks, and
for all self-awareness and encoding conditions.
Recognition scores were significantly positively correlated with age in
months (r2 = .26, p = .04). However, neither task type nor self-awareness
condition had a significant main effect on recognition.
Children showed a significant recognition bias for self- (M = 6.5, SD =
0.2) over other-related (M = 6, SD = 0.3) stimuli, F(1, 58) = 6.2, p = .016, ηp2
= 0.1, regardless of task type (photo-action task: self-referent M = 6.3, SD =
0.4, other-referent M = 5.7, SD = 0.4; pronoun-action task: self-referent M =
6.7, SD = 0.4, other-referent M = 6.4, SD = 0.4) or self-awareness condition
(mirror present: self-referent M = 6.5, SD = 0.3, other-referent M = 5.9, SD
= 0.4; mirror absent: self-referent M = 6.5, SD = 0.3, other-referent M = 6.3,
SD = 0.4). A three-way interaction between the SRE, task type, and self-
awareness condition approached but did not reach significance, F(1, 58)
= 2.9, p = .09, ηp2 = 0.05.
Within the photo-action task, children showed a significant bias for self-
referent stimuli, F(1, 28) = 4.6, p = .04, ηp2 = 0.1, regardless of self-awareness
condition. In contrast, the overall SRE in the pronoun-action task was not
significant. However, as found for 3-year-olds in Experiment 3, there was a
significant interaction between self-reference effects and self-awareness condi-
tion, F(1, 28) = 4.9, p = .035, ηp2 = 0.15. As evident in Table 4, and confirmed
by independent analysis, 4-year-olds showed a strong bias for self-referent
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TABLE 4
Experiment 4 Recognition Performance Split by Task Type, Encoding Dimension, and
Self-Awareness Condition
Self-Awareness Condition
Recognition Overall Mirror No Mirror
Photo-action task
Overall M = 12 (75%),
SD = 4.2
M = 12.2 (76%),
SD = 4.1
M = 11.9 (74%),
SD = 4.6
(t(29) = 10.2, p < .001) (t(14) = 7.7, p < .001) (t(14) = 6.6, p < .001)
Self-referent M = 6.3 (78%),
SD = 2
M = 6.3 (78%),
SD = 2
M = 6.2 (77%),
SD = 2.1
(t(29) = 11.4, p < .001) (t(14) = 8.2, p < .001) (t(14) = 7.7, p < .001)
Other-referent M = 5.7 (71%),
SD = 2.4
M = 5.9 (74%),
SD = 2.3
M = 5.6 (70%),
SD = 2.6
(t(29) = 8.3, p < .001) (t(14) = 6.4, p < .001) (t(14) = 5.3, p < .001)
Pronoun-action task
Overall M = 13.1 (81.8%),
SD = 3.5
M = 12.6 (79%),
SD = 4
M = 13.6(85%),
SD = 3.1
(t(29) = 14.1, p < .001) (t(14) = 8.3, p < .001) (t(14) = 12.2, p < .001)
Self-referent M = 6.7 (84%),
SD = 1.8
M = 6.7 (84%),
SD = 1.8
M = 6.7 (84%),
SD = 1.8
(t(29) = 14.5, p < .001) (t(14) = 10, p < .001) (t(14) = 10.2, p < .001)
Other-referent M = 6.4 (80%),
SD = 2
M = 5.9 (74%),
SD = 2.2
M = 6.9 (86%),
SD = 1.6
(t(29) = 12.1, p < .001) (t(14) = 6.7, p < .001) (t(14) = 12.1, p < .001)
Note.—Eleven children (M = 54 months) performed at ceiling, recognizing all 16 stimuli.
stimuli when the mirror was present at encoding, F(1, 14)= 9.3, p = .01, ηp2 =
0.4. However, when the mirror was absent, they recognized a similar number
of self- and other-referent stimuli.
At an average of 83% (SD = 17%) correct, children were significantly
above chance at monitoring the source of recognized stimuli in the photo-
action task, t(29) = 10.5, p < .01. There was no effect of self-awareness con-
dition on accurate source monitoring (mirror present: M = 82%, SD = 14%;
mirror absent: M = 84%, SD = 20%).
COMPARISON OF THE MAGNITUDE OF SIGNIFICANT SRE IN EXPERIMENTS 3
AND 4
In Experiment 3, 3-year-olds showed a significant recognition SRE, and
this effect was replicated for 3.5- to 4-year-olds in Experiment 4. To con-
firm whether age had an impact on the magnitude of this effect, we brought
together the relevant data (percentage of self- and other-referent stimuli
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recognized by sixty 3-year-olds in Experiment 3 and sixty 3.5- to 4-year-olds
in Experiment 4) and ran a two-factor (self- vs. other-referent) repeated-
measures ANOVA, including age, task type, and self-awareness condition
as between-subjects variables. This confirmed a significant overall SRE,
F(1, 112) = 19.1, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.15, with no interaction with age. The
only significant interaction was between task type and self-awareness, F(1,
112) = 5.3, p = .02, ηp2 = 0.045; this reflected the role of the mirror in driving
the SRE in the pronoun task.
Discussion
Experiment 4 confirms that 4-year-olds show an SRE in memory when
task demands are sufficiently high. Just as shown by 3-year-olds in Experi-
ment 3, 4-year-olds showed a bias for the recognition of stimuli that had been
presented pictorially or, provided they were self-focused, verbally as part of
a self-performed action. As in Experiment 2, 4-year-olds proved adept at ex-
plicitly differentiating between the roles of self and other in an event after a
short delay. Together then, Experiments 3 and 4 provide new evidence that
preschool children show both explicit self-other differentiation in memory
and an accompanying self-reference advantage. Although memory capacity
generally increasedwith age, younger and older children both showed a signif-
icant self-bias of similar magnitude, providing task difficulty was calibrated to
their abilities. This confirms that preschoolers’ cognitive processing of events
can be linked to, and is likely to mnemonically benefit from, the activation of
self-awareness.
Note though, that although mirror-induced self-focus was expected to
boost memory for “I” statements, inspection of the data reveals that this did
not occur. Rather, the mirror-induced SRE appeared attributable to a de-
crease in recognition of other-referent stimuli (see Figure 4, Table 4). This
result highlights an oversight in the developmental SRE literature. As in our
experiments, most studies have relied on comparison of memory for self- and
other-referent events experienced in tandem (five out of six developmen-
tal studies, i.e., Pullyblank et al., 1985; Baker-Ward et al., 1990; Summers &
Craik, 1994; Millward et al., 2000; Sui & Zui, 2005; 77% of studies in Symons
& Johnson’s [1997] meta-analysis of studies with adults). Crucially though,
when self-processing is qualified only in the context of other-processing, it is
difficult to conclude that self-processing is independently superior. Rather, it
may be that the introduction of self-focused attention detracts from nonself-
referent processing. For example, in this study, it is difficult to determine
whether self-photographs increased self-memories or decreased other memo-
ries, relative to the norm. Importantly, if the SRE is premised on the strength
of the self-concept, self-processing should be superior to other-processing
even when considered in isolation. One simple way to test this hypothesis is to
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include an independent other-referent control. Another way to minimize the
chances of an attention-based effect is to use objectively self-neutral stimuli
(e.g., as achieved in trait description tasks). These design adjustments are
incorporated in the final experiments, reported in the following chapter.
NOTES
7. Although stimulus-object pairs were no longer available, Sui and Zhu (2005) reported
that children stated who was pointing in the present tense and used the unnatural phrase
“Other is.” These idiosyncrasies might reflect translation problems because the study was con-
ducted in Beijing. However, if children were required to use the unusual phrase “Other is,” this
novelty might explain why 4-year-olds found other-referent stimuli slightly more memorable.
However, the results of Experiment 3 suggest this is not the full explanation.
8. Children’s names might be considered directly self-reflective; however, in Experiment
1, the name referred to the cartoon, not to the child.
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IV. THE IMPACT OF SOCIO-COGNITIVE SELF-REFERENCE
ON PRESCHOOLERS’ MEMORY FOR OWNED OBJECTS
In Experiments 5, 6, and 7, visual links between self and objects are
replaced with the cognitive link of object ownership. In encoding an object as
“mine,” an explicit link is made between that object and oneself. Moreover, in
recovering this link, one brings knowledge of the past self to bear on self-other
differentiation in the present. This has led to the suggestion that accurately
claiming ownership after a delay implies not only cognitive self-recognition
but also self-conservation (Fasig, 2000). Despite these important implications,
processing ownership appears less linguistically and socio-cognitively complex
than processing trait adjectives. To judge a trait adjective as self-referent
children must have the vocabulary to recognize the word and the insight
to match it to the sum of their past behavior/state. By contrast to judge an
owned object as self-related, they need only understand one word and one
past relation, “mine.” Indeed, through observation of children at home or in
play groups, it has been established that children as young as 2 years act as
though they have an understanding of ownership.
Hay’s (2006) longitudinal data suggest that children begin to use the
possessive pronouns “mine/yours” in spontaneous conversation with their
peers by the age of 2 years. Further, Ross (1996) found that 2-year-olds were
capable ofmaking coherent arguments for ownership, distinguishing between
current possession and past possession, when involved in toy disputes with
siblings. Investigating how children typically acquire ownership information
in social contexts, Friedman and Neary (2008) showed that 2- to 4-year-olds
make implicit assumptions about ownership based on which story character
first possessed an item. Providing further evidence that preschool children
act appropriately on ownership information, Eisenberg-Berg and colleagues
(Eisenberg-Berg, Haake, & Bartlett, 1981; Eisenberg-Berg, Haake, Hand, &
Sadalla, 1979) reported that 2.5- to 3-year-olds given a novel toy and told it
belongs to them defended this toy in a classroom situation to a greater extent
than children given a toy with the instruction that it “belongs to the class.”
Of direct relevance to the claim that self-referent ownership informa-
tion relies on self-awareness, Levine (1983) demonstrated that 2-year-old chil-
dren scoring highly in personal pronoun production and comprehension
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claimed and maintained contact with their own toys to a greater extent than
less verbally accomplished peers. Contrary to nominal labels, the referents
of pronominal forms constantly shift depending on speaker/listener roles
(Bates, 1990). For this reason, personal pronoun production and compre-
hension requires a capacity to reflect on the self from the perspective of an-
other, that is, a linguistic analog of mirror self-recognition. Indeed, as noted
in the introductory chapter, objective self-awareness as measured by the mir-
ror mark test predicts competency in personal pronoun use (Courage et al.,
2004; Lewis & Ramsay, 2004). In further support, in autism difficulties with
socio-cognitive self-awareness extend to problems in the acquisition and use
of personal pronouns (Lee, Hobson, & Chiat, 1994; Tager-Flusberg, 1993).
Note, though, that because “mine” is an extension of the “my/your” distinc-
tion, a correlation between personal pronoun competency and ownership as
expressed verbally is hardly surprising. Despite this caveat, the link between
children’s “territorial” toy behavior and their grasp of personal pronouns con-
firms that children are not only paying lip service to their agency. The extent
to which children are self-defining in language is linked to their capacity to
behaviorally mark items as their own.
Rather than observing peer interactions, Fasig (2000) sought to experi-
mentally assess 2-year-olds’ ownership understanding by asking them to explic-
itly differentiate between objects based on ownership. To substantiate the link
between ownership understanding and the self, she compared performance
on this task with parental reports of children’s self-awareness (as measured by
Stipek et al.’s, 1990, Self-Development Questionnaire) and performance in
the mark test of mirror self-recognition. In the ownership task, children were
first asked to label everyday items as belonging to themselves or their mother.
For each object (toothbrush, book, shoe), two familiar exemplars and one
unfamiliar example were shown. Children were given three ownership ques-
tions relating to these objects, each potentially earning one point: “Whose is
this?” for child’s item, “Whose is this?” formother’s item, and “Pick up the one
that is yours.” Fasig (2000) also asked for ownership information concerning
three differently colored blocks: One block was entirely novel, and two had
been presented a fewminutes before. To encode ownership information, one
of these blocks had been repeatedly labeled as belonging to the child and the
other as belonging to the experimenter.
When ownership scores for all four stimuli types (toothbrush, book, shoe,
and block) were combined, 2-year-olds were found to be above chance in as-
signing ownership, scoring 77% correct. Fasig (2000) therefore suggested
that self-conservation has an earlier ontogeny than implied by Povinelli
et al.’s (1996) task. However, despite acknowledging the block task as the
“most stringent test of ownership understanding”, and suggesting that it be
analyzed separately (Fasig, 2000, p. 377), no such analysis was reported. It is
difficult to distinguish whether children judging familiar items have explicit
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knowledge of the object as belonging to them in the past, or if they are simply
expressing a current, strong association. In contrast, ownership information
for novel objects clearly requires explicit self-reference.
Perhaps as a result, Fasig’s (2000) success in empirically linking perfor-
mance in the ownership task with other measures of self-awareness was mixed.
That author found a positive link between competency in the ownership tasks
and children’s use of descriptive and evaluative language concerning the self.
In this 12-item facet of Stipek et al.’s (1990) scale, mothers rate their child’s
tendency to make descriptive claims beginning with “I am” or “Johnny is,” ex-
tending to those that involve an aspect of evaluation (e.g., “I ambad”) or desire
(e.g., “I want chips”). Importantly, this suggests that the link between owner-
ship claims and self-reflective languagemay extend beyond personal pronoun
competency. There was also amoderate correlation withmothers’ assessments
of their child’s self-recognition. However, no direct link between the mark
test of mirror self-recognition and ownership performance was found.
In explanation, Fasig (2000) suggested that the external nature of mir-
ror self-recognition might dissociate it from internalized measures of self-
recognition such as ownership, linguistic self-reference, attention seeking,
and the communication of desires. However, it is not clear how owning an
object can be considered internalized to a greater extent than “owning” one’s
self-image, as implied by mirror self-recognition. Moreover, Lewis and Ram-
say (2004) and Courage et al. (2004) showed longitudinally that internalized
self-reflection, as indicated by personal pronoun use, can be related to mir-
ror self-recognition. For these reasons, it appears more likely that the lack
of association in Fasig’s (2000) study reflected her failure to differentiate
familiar and unfamiliar ownership information and a lack of power arising
from coding mirror self-recognition on a binary basis (with the majority of
the sample passing the task). The latter point highlights a limitation of the
mirror mark test as a tool to validate increments in self-awareness beyond the
onset of “me.”
EXPERIMENT 5
Building on Fasig’s (2000) research, Experiment 5 aims to assess whether
children can encode ownership information for recently acquired unfamiliar
items at above-chance levels. To allow thorough assessment of their perfor-
mance, children were asked to distinguish a total of eight items based on
ownership. Moreover, prior to declaring ownership information, children
were required to (a) recall stimuli or (b) recognize the stimuli in a group of
previously unseen distracters. This ensured that children were accessing their
memory of the previous session before making ownership judgments. To sub-
stantiate Fasig’s (2000) suggestion that ownership claims make reference to
48
THE IMPACT OF SOCIO-COGNITIVE SELF-REFERENCE ON PRESCHOOLERS’ MEMORY
the past self, the delay between encoding of ownership information was in-
creased from a fewminutes to 1 week. Maintenance of ownership information
beyond the present (or recent past) is important because it implies that the
information has been encoded, and is explicitly retrievable, with reference to
the self-concept.
To support the encoding of lasting ownership memories, Experiment
5 includes both verbal labeling of objects as belonging to self or other and
active processing of this information. Specifically, children are asked to act on
verbally presented ownership information by sorting the objects into distinct
locations based on their owner. As highlighted in Experiment 1, participating
actively in an event is likely to increase depth of processing and so aid retrieval
of to-be-remembered material. However, to allow focus on higher level self-
reference, children had equal physical experience of both owned and not-
owned stimuli. By virtue of the theoretical link made between ownership
memory and the self-concept, we expected that Experiment 5 might also
be open to self-reference effects. The discovery of an ownership SRE would
empirically consolidate the claim that owned items are associated with the
self-concept.
Encouragingly, Cunningham,Turk,MacDonald, andMacrae (2008) have
recently reported that adults given a surprise recognition test after sorting 216
shopping items into their own or a confederate’s basket showed a mnemonic
bias for owned items. In addition to this within-subjects effect, we might ex-
pect a between-subjects effect, showing a bias for objects sorted on the basis
of self-referent ownership (mine/not mine) in comparison to those sorted in
non-self-referent terms. Recall that Bennett and Sani (2008) found a differ-
ence between children who judged words in terms of whether they applied to
the self and those who processed words in a non-self-reflective way. To explore
the possibility of an “independent” SRE, Experiment 5 also includes a compar-
ison group of children asked to retrieve stimuli and ownership information
concerning two peers.
Method
Participants
Ninety preschool children took part: forty-five 3-year-olds (M =
38.9 months, SD = 2.4 months, range = 33–42 months) and forty-five 4-
year-olds (M = 50.3 months, SD = 4.7 months, range = 43–59 months).
Approximately half of the children from each age group completed a self-
referent ownership task, and the remainder a non-self-referent version (total
N per task = 45).
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Materials
At encoding, the experimental stimuli comprised eight A6 ownership
cards depicting different animals and two boxes (one red and one blue)
painted to resemble zoos. At retrieval, eight A4 recognition cards were intro-
duced. Each recognition card showed one of the animals from the ownership
cards together with three “distracter” animals that were not previously en-
countered. All animals were comparably drawn and pilot work confirmed
that they were easily recognizable to preschool children. Examples of these
stimuli are shown in Figure 5. In the non-self-referent version of the game,
two Polaroid photographs of unfamiliar peers (one boy and one girl) were
also included.
Procedure
Throughout the procedure, the order of personal and other-referent
pronouns and names (i.e., mine, my; yours, your; Billy, Mary) was counter-
balanced. In the non-self-referent game Polaroid photographs, each showing
the face of an unfamiliar child (“Mary” and “Billy”), were stuck to the front
of the appropriate zoos. The procedure was introduced to children as fol-
lows: “Today we are going to look after some zoo animals. This zoo is Y’s
(yours/Mary’s), and this zoo is Z’s (mine/Billy’s). I have some animals to
share between the zoos. Some will be Y’s and some will be Z’s.”
Having introduced the task, the experimenter drew animal cards at ran-
dom from the pack and said: “This is a(n) X (e.g., elephant) and it belongs to
Y. The X lives in Y’s zoo.” The child was then asked to place the animal out
of sight in the appropriate zoo. The experimenter proceeded: “This is a(n) X
and it belongs to Z. The X lives in Z’s zoo.” Again, the child was asked to place
the animal out of sight inside the appropriate zoo. This procedure continued
until all eight animals had been assigned an owner (four animals per zoo).
Placing the animals inside the zoos ensured that the next animal drawn from
the pack was given full visual attention and helped to engage the children.
After distributing the animals, the experimenter removed the cards from
each zoo (order counterbalanced) and laid them on the desk in front of their
owners, saying, “So these are all of Y’s animals and these are all of Z’s animals.
It is important that we know which animals belong to whom so that they don’t
get lost. I need you to helpme remember which animals belong to which zoo.”
For each animal, the experimenter then asked the child, “Is this Y’s animal
or Z’s animal?” Incorrect answers were corrected. After ownership had been
established in this way, the animal cards were shuffled and laid out one at a
time on the desk. For each card, the child was asked, “Does this animal belong
in Y’s zoo or Z’s zoo? Put the animal back in the zoo it belongs in.”
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Figure 5.—Examples of Experiment 5 encoding and retrieval stimuli.
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One week later, children met again with the experimenter and were
verbally reminded of the first session and asked if they could recall any of
the animals and, if so, who owned them. Children were then told that the
animals had escaped and become mixed up with animals belonging to other
people. To test for recognition of animals from the previous session, they
were then shown one animal from the previous session together with three
novel animals (placement of target on recognition card counterbalanced).
The experimenter stated the types of animals on each card and asked, “I
know we only played with one of these animals last time. Do you remember
which one?” This procedure was repeated for all eight previously encountered
animals, each timewith a different set of distracters. To cue recall of ownership
the child was then asked for each original animal, “Is that Y’s animal or Z’s
animal?” As each child had the same amount of visual and motor exposure
to all stimuli, animals were equally familiar; only the verbal-cognitive link
specifying ownership differentiated them. Children were given general praise
throughout but no specific feedback concerning accuracy; at the end of the
session, they were given a sticker as a reward for participation.
Analysis
One-sample t tests were used to determine if recognition memory and
ownership assignments were above chance. Univariate ANOVAs were used to
assess the impact of age and task type on ownership assignments at encoding
and retrieval. A two-level (recall and recognition), two-factor (self-referent
vs. other-referent) repeated-measures ANOVA with age group and task type
as between-subjects factors was used to explore memory performance. To
explore within-task SREs this analysis was also run separately for each task type
(self-referent and other-referent). Within the other-referent control task, we
originally intended to make comparisons between memory for stimuli owned
by Mary and Billy. However, Experiment 1 alerts us to the possibility that this
task could also be interpreted on a self-referent basis; that is, children could
show a mnemonic bias for the actor who shared their gender. For this reason,
this within-task analysis was also run on data entered as gender matched to
the participant versus nongender matched.
Results
Encoding Ownership
Correctly assigning ownership to an average of 6.8 (85%) animals (SD =
1.2), children were above chance in assigning ownership in the first session,
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t(89)= 21.5, p< .001. Although both age groups were highly accurate, 4-year-
olds (M = 6.9 (86%), SD = 1.1, t(44) = 15, p < .001) were consistently better
at assigning ownership than 3-year-olds (M = 6.6 (82%), SD = 1.3, t(44) =
15.4, p < .001) (F(1, 86) = 6.5, p = .012, ηp2 = 0.07). Children were equally
successful in encoding ownership in both task types (self-referent task: M =
6.9 (86%), SD = 1.1, t(44) = 15, p < .001; non-self-referent task: M = 6.6
(82%), SD = 1.3, t(44) = 15.4, p < .001).
Recall
In the second session, 46 children (fifteen 3-year-olds and thirty-one 4-
year-olds) offered free recall of animals presented in Session 1 (M= 2.7, SD=
1.6). Age had amain effect on recall scores such that 4-year-olds outperformed
3-year-olds (3-year-olds:M= 0.5, SD= 0.2; 4-year-olds:M= 2.2, SD= 0.3; F(1,
86) = 27.8, p < .01, ηp2 = 0.2). However, there was no significant between-
subjects effect of task type on the total number of animals recalled (self-
referent taskM = 1.6, SD = 0.3; other-referent taskM = 1.1, SD = 0.3).
Within the self-referent task, children recalled significantly more of the
animals owned by themselves (M = 0.9, SD = 1.2) than those owned by the
experimenter (M= 0.7, SD= 0.9) (F(1, 43)= 4.2, p= .046, ηp2 = 0.09). Within
the other-referent task, no significant bias emerged when comparing recall
memory for Mary and Billy’s animals (Mary M = 0.6, SD = 0.11, Billy M =
0.5, SD = 0.13). However, reentry of the data on a “self-referent” versus “non-
self-referent” basis showed that although not reaching significance, children
tended to recall more animals owned by a same gender peer (M = 0.7, SD =
0.9) than those owned by a different gender peer (M = 0.4, SD = 0.8) (F(1,
43) = 3.2, p = .08, ηp2 = 0.07). There were no interactions with age.
Ownership assignments were accurate for an above-chance average of
84% (SD = 24%) of recalled animals, t(45) = 9.5, p < .01. For children
offering free recall, there was no evidence for an effect of age (3-year-olds
M = 87%, SD = 6%, t(14) = 4.7, p < .01; 4-year-olds M = 82%, SD = 4%,
t(30)= 8.5, p< .01) or task type (self-referent taskM= 86%, SD= 5%, t(20)=
5.3, p < .01; other-referent task M = 83%, SD = 5%, t(24) = 8.1, p < .01) on
the percentage of correct assignments.
Recognition
As shown in Table 5, recognition performance was above chance for both
tasks and age groups, for all encoding dimensions.
As for recall data, 4-year-olds consistently outperformed 3-year-olds in
the recognition task, F(1, 86) = 14, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.14. Here, task type had
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TABLE 5
Experiment 5 Recognition Performance Split by Task, Encoding Dimension,
and Age Group
Unmatched M = 2.8 (70%), M = 2.7 (67.5%), M = 3.1 (77.5%),
owned gender SD = 0.9 SD = 0.9 SD = 0.9
(t(44) = 9.9, p < .001) (t(22) = 9.1, p < .001) (t(21) = 11.3, p < .001)
Note.—Thirty-seven children (thirteen 3-year-olds, twenty-four 4-year-olds; twenty-three self-referent, four-
teen non-self-referent) performed at ceiling.
a marginally nonsignificant between-subjects effect, F(1, 86) = 3.4, p = .07,
ηp
2 = 0.04, such that children tended to recognize more stimuli in the self-
referent ownership task. However, there was no significant recognition bias
for self-owned stimuli within the self-referent ownership task. Nor was any
recognition bias evident within the other-referent control task (regardless of
whether datawere entered in order tomake comparisons between recognition
memory for Mary and Billy’s items or for same gender-owned versus opposite
gender-owned stimuli).
Children gave accurate ownership information for an above-chance aver-
age of 70% (SD = 23%) of the animals they recognized, t(89) = 7.9, p < .01.
Analysis confirmed that 3-year-olds (M = 69.6%, SD = 24%, t(44) = 5.6, p <
.01) and 4-year-olds (M = 70%, SD = 23%, t(44) = 5.7, p < .01) performed
very similarly and success rates were similar for both task types (self-referent
M = 73%, SD = 24%; t(44) = 4.6, p < .01; other-referent M = 66.5%, SD =
22%; t(44) = 7, p < .01).
Discussion
Providing new empirical evidence that preschoolers can encode noncon-
ditioned ownership information, Experiment 5 showed that children as young
as 3 years were above chance in distinguishing recently experienced objects
on the basis of ownership. Moreover, although 3-year-olds had a more lim-
ited capacity to acquire ownership information and to remember previously
presented material, they were as adept as 4-year-olds in retrieving ownership
information for stimuli they did remember after a delay. Importantly, retriev-
ing accurate ownership information for the self required the children tomake
a retrospective cognitive link between the current self and owned material.
The current self could not be implicitly associated with the stimuli, as children
had the same physical experience of both self- and other-owned stimuli.
For the non-self-referent task, it is possible to argue that the cognitive link
made between owners and animals is a form of paired-associate learning. In
fact, the lack of any prior knowledge of the owners, and the visually accessible
pairing of owners and stimuli, lends itself to such an interpretation. However,
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not only were simple visual associations between stimuli and owners absent in
the self-referent version of the task, the nature of personal pronouns means
that children could not rely on word associations to encode ownership. Put
simply, if children relied on the same paired associations verbalized by the
experimenter in the self-referent task, their ownership information would be
encoded wrongly. When the experimenter says “Yours - Lion,” children must
encode “Mine - Lion” to succeed. Even if 3- and 4-year-old children were
engaged in reflexive associative learning, for example, “Your (- My)–Lion,”
“My (- Your)–Monkey,” their translation of yours to mine is a mystery without
recourse to contextual self-other differentiation. Even adults, who process
the personal relevance of pronouns automatically show activation of specific
brain areas associated with other aspects of self-reflection when engaged in
such a task (Esslen,Metzler, Pascual-Marqui, & Jancke, 2008;Walla, Duregger,
Griener, Thurner, & Ehrenberger, 2008). For this reason, if the children were
learning contextually translated word associates at encoding, they were doing
so with the self in mind.
In support of a link between owned stimuli and the self-concept, there was
some evidence of mnemonic bias for self-related stimuli. Children recalled
more animals that they themselves owned than animals owned by the ex-
perimenter, despite experiencing them equally on a physical-cognitive level.
Children also showed anonsignificant owner-based advantage in the “non-self-
referent” version of the task.Here, children tended to recallmore animals that
were owned by peers of the same gender as themselves than animals owned by
peers of the opposite gender. As noted in Experiment 1, gender information
is one of the first aspects of self-knowledge acquired. Moreover, in addition to
an advantage for trait judgments concerning children’s families, Bennett and
Sani (2008) found a marginal recall bias for judgments concerning children
of the same gender (“Do you think boys/girls are . . . ?”) and of like-aged peers
(“Do you think children of your age are . . . ?”). One explanation for Bennett
and Sani’s (2008) findings, and our similar result, is that children are index-
ing a self-reference effect resulting from a judgments made of “someone like
me,” where “me” activates the self-concept. This might explain why we did
not find a significant between tasks advantage for self-referent task.
It is interesting that despite obtaining a similar level of recall as in Exper-
iments 3 and 4, we find the first significant recall advantage in this cognitively
(rather than perceptually) based test. One possibility is that recall SREs repre-
sent, or require, a greater depth of processing than recognition SREs. So, for
example, although making an explicit visual link between self and stimuli at
encoding might be sufficient to activate a recognition bias at retrieval (to jog
memory), a cognitive link between self and stimuli might be required to give
this information explicit priority. Another possibility is that such a distinction
is traceable to encoding specificity. In paradigms where the link to self is
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visual, tapping perceptually based memories is likely to elicit the strongest
SRE.
EXPERIMENT 6
Aside from the amount of information retained, Experiment 5 uncovered
no differences in 3- and 4-year-olds’ capacity to claim ownership of animals
that were labeled as belonging to them 1 week before. Contrary to Povinelli
et al. (1996) then, Experiment 6 indicates that young 3-year-olds canmaintain
a cognitive link between their past and present selves. Nevertheless, it remains
possible that success in the delayed self-recognition (DSR) task might predict
children’s success in encoding ownership. To explore this possibility, Experi-
ment 6 directly compares 3- to 4-year-old children’s performance in Povinelli
et al.’s (1996) DSR task with their ability to encode and retrieve stimuli with
reference to ownership. If Povinelli et al.’s (1996) task does measure self-
conservation, performance here might also predict the magnitude of any
SRE found.
Method
Participants
Thirty preschool children took part: fifteen 3-year-olds (M= 36.9months,
SD = 2.2 months, range = 34–42 months) and fifteen 4-year-olds (M = 47.9
months, SD = 4.9 months, range = 43–55 months).
Materials
The experimental stimuli for the self-referent ownership gamewere those
used in Experiment 5. For the DSR task, a television, two video recorders, a
pink “Post-it” sticker, three paper cups, and a small toy-shopping trolley were
used.
Procedure
The procedure for the self-referent ownership task was described in Ex-
periment 5; prior to this task, children were tested for DSR. The DSR test was
adapted fromPovinelli et al.’s (1996) procedure as follows. Upon entering the
testing room, children were alerted to an activated video camera and asked
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to wave to it. They were told the camera was recording so that “we can watch
the game we are about to play on the television afterwards.” The child and
experimenter then played a game in which a toy-shopping trolley was hidden
under one of three cups while the child had their eyes shut. After the toy was
hidden, the child was told to open their eyes and to lift the cups one at a time
in order to find the toy. Children were given verbal and physical (brief pat on
the head) praise every time they located the toy for a total of four trials. On
the third trial, the experimenter used the head-pat to surreptitiously place a
pink sticker on the hair just above the child’s forehead.
When the game was finished, the videotape was rewound to the point
at which the child had waved. As the child was shown waving, the experi-
menter asked a self-recognition question: “Who is that?” The child was then
encouraged to watch to see how well they played the game. After watching the
marking event on video, corresponding to an approximately 3-min delay from
the “real” marking event, the experimenter waited 30 s for a reaction before
prompting: “What is that? . . . Is it a sticker? . . . Where is the sticker really?
Can you get me it?” If the child did not react by reaching up for the sticker,
they were given a hand mirror and the prompt repeated as appropriate. DSR
was scored post hoc using video footage of the children’s reactions; children
received 2 points for reaching for the mark before prompting, 1 point for
reaching after prompting, and 0 points for failing to reach during the video
playback.
Analysis
Pearson’s correlations were used to explore the relationship betweenDSR
performance and age, and between DSR performance and SREs. One-sample
t tests were used to determine if recognition memory and ownership assign-
ments were above chance. Univariate ANOVAs were used to assess the impact
of age on ownership assignments at encoding and retrieval. A two-factor
(self-owned vs. other-owned) repeated-measures ANOVA with age group as a
between-subjects factor was used to explore recognition performance.
Results
DSR Task
All fifteen 3.5- to 4-year-olds reached up to locate the sticker having viewed
the marking event, six after being verbally prompted. Seven 3-year-olds also
reached for the mark, three after verbal prompting. The remaining eight
3-year-olds did not reach up to locate the sticker until prompted by exposure
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to the mirror. There was a positive correlation between age in months and
delayed self-recognition score (r2 = .46, p = .01).
Of the 22 children who displayed mark-directed behavior, 17 responded
“me” to the self-recognition question, 2 gave their proper name, and 3 gave no
verbal response. Of the eight children who did not display mark-directed be-
havior, three responded “me,” two gave their proper name, and three gave no
verbal response. The relationship between responses to the self-recognition
question (2 points “me,” 1 point proper name, 0 points no verbal response)
and performance in the delayed self-recognition test was not significant.
Encoding Ownership
In the first session, children returned an above-chance average of 85%
(M = 6.8, SD = 1.2) of animals to the correct zoo, t(89) = 11.8, p < .01.
Although both age groups were above chance (3-year-olds:M= 6.2, SD= 1.1,
t(14) = 7.4, p < .01; 4-year-olds: M = 7.4, SD = 1.2, t(14) = 11.1, p < .01),
as in Experiment 5, 4-year-olds outperformed 3-year-olds, F(1, 28) = 7.9, p =
.009, ηp
2 = 0.2.
Recall
In the second session, 11 children (five 3-year-olds and six 4-year-olds)
offered free recall of animals presented in Session 1. These children remem-
bered an average of 2.36 (SD= 0.8) animals. Accurate ownership information
was given for a mean of 72% of (SD = 28%) recalled animals. This level of
ownership assignment was significantly above chance, t(10)= 2.5, p= .03. Al-
though this low rate of recall precludes statistical analysis, of animals recalled
16 were self-owned and 11 were owned by the experimenter.
Recognition
As shown in Table 6, the average number of animals recognized was
significantly above chance; this result held overall, and for both age groups
and encoding dimensions.
Agehadnomain effect on recognition scores. Therewas a large advantage
for recognition of self-owned over other-owned stimuli, F(1, 28)= 7, p= .013,
ηp
2 = 0.2, regardless of age.
Children gave accurate ownership information for an above-chance aver-
age of 73% (SD = 17%) of the animals recognized, t(29) = 7.3, p < .01. Both
age groups were above chance (3-year-olds:M= 69%, SD = 17%, t(14) = 4.2,
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TABLE 6
Experiment 6 Recognition Performance, Split by Encoding Dimension and Age Group
Age Group
Recognition Overall 3-Year-Old 4-Year-Old
Overall M = 5.6 (70%),
SD = 1.8
M = 5.4 (67%),
SD = 1.9
M = 5.9 (74%),
SD = 1.7
(t(29) = 10.4, p < .001) (t(29) = 6.6, p < .001) (t(29) = 8.1, p < .001)
Self-owned M = 3 (75%),
SD = 1
M = 2.7 (67%),
SD = 1
M = 3.2 (80%),
SD = 1
(t(44) = 11.1, p < .001) (t(14) = 6.9, p < .001) (t(14) = 9.1, p < .001)
Other-owned M = 2.6 (65%),
SD = 1
M = 2.5 (62%),
SD = 1.1
M = 2.7 (67%),
SD = 0.8
(t(44) = 8.9, p < .001) (t(14) = 5.2, p < .001) (t(14) = 7.5, p < .001)
Note.—Four children (two 3-year-olds, two 4-year-olds) performed at ceiling.
p = .01; 4-year-olds: M = 77%, SD = 16%, t(14) = 6.3, p < .01), and analysis
confirmed that age had no significant effect on ownership assignment.
Comparison of Ownership and DSR Task
Children who failed the self-recognition task performed similarly to those
who passed in encoding and retrieving ownership information. As shown in
Table 7 one-sample t tests confirmed that all DSR groups were above-chance
level in assigning ownership.
Moreover, DSR and ownership performance did not correlate. Nor was
there a correlation between DSR performance and the magnitude of differ-
ence in recognition between self-owned and other-owned stimuli, that is, the
SRE.
TABLE 7
Comparison of Performance in Experiment 6 Self-Referent Ownership and Delayed
Self-Recognition Tasks
% Correct Ownership Assignments
DSR Performance Session 1: Encoding Session 3: After Recognition
No reaching 83% 71%
(t(7) = 7, p < .001) (t(7) = 3, p = .01)
Reach after prompt 85% 73%
(t(9) = 6, p < .001) (t(9) = 4, p = .03)
Immediate reach 86% 75%
(t(11) = 7, p < .001) (t(11) = 5, p < .001)
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Discussion
Performance in the DSR task closely replicated Povinelli et al.’s (1996)
results; 60% of 4-year-olds but only 27% of 3-year-olds reached for the mark
without prompting. A further 40%of 4-year-olds and 20%of younger children
passed the task after verbal prompting. The remaining 3-year-olds successfully
retrieved the sticker only upon being exposed to a mirror. As noted, Povinelli
et al. (1996) interpreted younger children’s failure on theDSR task as a failure
to make a cognitive link between the past self, as represented in the video
footage, and the present self. However, in Experiment 6, success on the DSR
task was not associated with the ability to link the past self, as represented
in a claim of ownership, with the present self. Children who failed the DSR
task were as adept at assigning ownership as those who passed it. Moreover,
in this sample, the magnitude of the now-significant recognition SRE was
not related to DSR performance. In keeping with concerns regarding ceiling
effects tested in Experiment 4, one reason that the recognition SRE might
reach significance here but not in Experiment 5 is that fewer children (13%
compared to 41%) performed at ceiling, leaving more scope to index an
effect.
As noted in Chapter I, Skouteris et al. (2006) showed that using the
video image to guide searches prior to DSR results in a greater proportion
of 3-year-olds exhibiting mark-directed behavior. This raises the possibility
that performance in the DSR might be related to ownership memory when
difficulties interpreting video-based representations are controlled for. To
test this hypothesis, training could be provided and 2-year-olds included in
the sample to represent poor DSR performance. However, the likely benefit
of video-guided searches is that they allow the child to learn that searching
in the location on the video will bring success. This makes the extent to
which trained children make reference to the self (other than as a location)
doubtful. In support, 6 of 13 children in Skouteris et al.’s (2006) training
conditions reached for the mark only after hearing the prompt “find me the
sticker.” For the remainder, who showed self-directed behavior immediately,
the authors provide no information on ability to pass the DSR task prior to
training. This makes it impossible to determine if they belonged to the subset
of 3-year-olds who pass the DSR test naturally.
In any case, the dissociation between the ownership task and the DSR task
can be explained in reference to the relative demands of each task. The DSR
task requires making a link between self as represented internally, and the self
as represented externally. Likewise, the ownership task requires maintenance
of an internal link with an external object. However, only in the DSR task
do past and current self-representations conflict, meaning that the children
must revise a false belief (“I am not marked”). Younger preschoolers’ difficul-
ties in acknowledging false beliefs are well documented (see Mitchell, 1996;
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Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). This implies that the DSR task may be
overly demanding for this age group, regardless of self-recognition or a video
deficit. Interestingly, Saltmarsh and Mitchell (1999) showed that experience
of video footage can actually support 3-year-olds in reporting memories that
conflict with current knowledge. Three-year-olds asked to predict the con-
tents of a familiar container (e.g., a candy tube) and then shown that the
container holds unexpected contents (e.g., crayons) will typically deny their
original prediction (“candy”), stating instead what they now know to be in
the container (“crayons”). However, Saltmarsh and Mitchell (1999) found
that when confronted with video footage of their original prediction, 3- to
4-year-olds were significantly (41%) more likely to acknowledge their past
false belief.
The crucial difference between Saltmarsh and Mitchell’s (1999) task and
the DSR task is that the video footage makes salient what they child previously
subjectively experienced; it does not require them to objectively reinterpret
a past event. Although using time rather than representational change to
separate past from present selves, the ownership task also supports children’s
memories of the self in the past through the provision of salient cues. In
contrast to both of these tasks, the DSR task requires children to revise, rather
than recover, amemory of the self in the past. Importantly, the demands of the
ownership task appear particularly closely matched to those of autobiograph-
ical memory, requiring that children maintain a nonconflicting connection
between past and present selves.
EXPERIMENT 7
Experiments 5 and 6 focused on the link between ownership, self-
conservation, and autobiographical processing. However, given that the
ownership task relies on making an internal link between self and to-be-
remembered stimuli, this paradigm may also offer the closest analog to the
SRE established for adults. Just as trait adjectives are self-neutral before cog-
nitive processing as self- or non-self-referent, the novel stimuli involved in
the ownership task can only be considered self-referent postprocessing. As a
result, we control for the contribution of self-focused attention to the effect.
This is important, as rather than dictating what is encoded (as we hypothesize
this might happen for an SRE driven by attention), the mnemonic bias for
self-referent stimuli in the ownership task must be due to the type of pro-
cessing it receives. Experiments 5 and 6 confirmed that children can make
lasting representations of ownership even when stimuli are novel, similar, and
experienced relatively briefly. The aim of Experiment 7 was to use a typical
short delay SRE paradigm to confirm that this link is sufficient to support an
immediate mnemonic advantage.
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Although a significant ownership SRE is supported by Experiments 5 and
6, observation and elucidation of the effect was compromised by an appar-
ently inadequate control task. This is important because the purpose of the
between-subjects aspect of the design employedherewas to allow independent
observation of self- and other-referent processing. As noted, difficulty finding
a non-self-referent control is relatively common. For example, in Bennett and
Sani’s (2008) study, when self (e.g., “Are you clever?”) and non-self (e.g., “Are
dogs clever?”) processing was compared between children, many in the non-
self condition began to talk about the family pet. Perhaps as a result, the SRE
obtained was marginal. In fact, it has been repeatedly suggested that one of
the reasons the self-concept is so elaborated (and mnemonically valuable) is
that self-reference is our default encoding condition (Catrambone, Beike, &
Niedenthal, 1996; Catrambone & Markus, 1987; Fong & Markus, 1982; Wells,
Hoffman, & Enzel, 1984). Nevertheless, inclusion of an appropriate control
is important as the only previously published test of the ownership SRE (Cun-
ningham et al., 2008) conceived of the test solely as a within-subjects effect, of-
fering no independent comparison with non-self-referent processing. For this
reason, Experiment 7 adapts Cunningham et al.’s (2008) shopping paradigm
for use with two groups of preschoolers: using ownership information to sort
shopping items between baskets for one group and basket color as a sorting
rule for another group.
Method
Participants
Fifty children took part: twenty-five 3-year-olds (M = 39.8 months, SD =
1.3 months, range = 37–42 months) and twenty-five 4-year-olds (M = 52.1
months, SD = 4.2 months, range = 43–58 months). Thirteen 3-year-olds and
twelve 4-year-olds completed the self-referent ownership task; the remaining
25 children completed the non-self-referent control task.
Materials
Three toy-shopping baskets were used (one green and two blue); in
the self-referent version of the task, both baskets were blue, in the non-self-
referent control, the two baskets were of different colors (one green and one
blue).9 At encoding, the experimental stimuli comprised 16 A6 photographic
images of everyday food items (e.g., eggs, bread, bananas). At retrieval, 16
A4 recognition cards were introduced. Each recognition card showed one
of the target shopping items together with two distracter animals that were
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Figure 6.—Examples of Experiment 7 encoding and retrieval stimuli.
not previously encountered. Pilot work confirmed that the items were easily
recognizable to preschool children. Examples of these stimuli are shown in
Figure 6.
Procedure
Under each condition, participants were encouraged to imagine that they
were on a shopping trip with the experimenter to buy various food items.
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On the table in front of them sat two baskets. In the ownership condition,
children were told that one of the baskets was theirs and any items placed
in their basket would belong to them, the other basket belonged to the
experimenter. In the non-self-referent control, childrenwere simply informed
that the shopping would be shared between the green and blue baskets. In
the ownership condition, the experimenter drew (at random) cards depicting
different foods from the pack of 16 target cards and said, “Can you tell me
what this is a picture of?” (e.g., apple) then (depending on whose turn it was
to receive an item): “That is my/your ____ now! Can you put the ______ in
my/your basket please?” This continued for all target items (eight per basket).
In the control condition, once identified, items were allocated on the basis
of color, that is, “Can you put that item in the green/blue basket, please?”
After distribution of the target items, the experimenter placed both baskets
out of sight. As described for Experiments 2, 3, and 4, children then played a
brief distracter game, involving a marble being hidden beneath one of three
cups.
Following thedistracter game, to test free recall of previously encountered
items, the experimenter said, “Do you remember we played a shopping game
earlier? Do you remember any of the things we bought?” For each recalled
item, the child was asked, “Who bought that? Was that mine or yours?” or
“Which basket did that go in? Was that in the green basket or the blue
basket?” To test for recognition of items from the previous session, they were
then shown one target item together with two novel items (placement of
target on recognition card counterbalanced). The experimenter named the
items on the card and said, “I know we bought one of these things, can you
remember which one?” As in they did earlier, children were then required to
identify the source of recognized items (mine/yours/blue/green). Reference
to personal pronouns and colors was counterbalanced throughout. As before,
children were given a sticker at the end of the task to reward them for taking
part.
Analysis
One-sample t tests were used to determine if recognition memory and
ownership assignments were above chance. Univariate ANOVAs were used to
assess the impact of age and task type on ownership assignments at retrieval. A
two-level (recall and recognition) two-factor (self-referent vs. other-referent)
repeated-measures ANOVA with age group and task type as between-subjects
factors was used to explore memory performance. To explore within-task
SREs, this analysis was also run separately for each task type (self-referent and
other-referent).
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Results
Recall
Forty-five children (twenty-one 3-year-olds and twenty-four 4-year-olds)
offered free recall of the shopping items (M= 4.5, SD= 3.2). Age had a main
effect on recall scores, F(1, 46) = 18.1, p < .01, ηp2 = 0.28, with 4-year-olds
(M= 5.9, SD= 0.6) outperforming 3-year-olds (M= 2.3, SD= 0.6). However,
there was no between-subjects effect of task type on the overall number of
items recalled (ownershipM = 2, SD = 0.6; control M = 2.1, SD = 0.6).
Within the ownership task, children recalled significantly more of the
shopping items owned by themselves (M = 2.7, SD = 0.2) than those owned
by the experimenter (M = 1.3, SD = 1.7) (F(1, 23) = 27.6, p < .001, ηp2 =
0.5). This SRE significantly interacted with age, F(1, 23) = 4.6, p = .04, ηp2 =
0.17, such that 4-year-olds showed a larger bias (3-year-olds’ M bias = 0.847;
4-year-olds’ M bias = 2). Nevertheless, the SRE was significant for both age
groups when analyzed separately (3-year-olds: F(1, 11) = 9.4, p = .01, ηp2 =
0.46; 4-year-olds: F(1, 12) = 19.5, p = .001, ηp2 = 0.61), despite the small
sample size. By contrast, in the color-control task there was no significant
recall bias (green M = 2.3, SD = 0.4; blue M = 1.9, SD = 0.4) or interaction
with age.
Ownership assignments were accurate for an average of 72.2% (SD =
29%) of recalled items. A one-sample test confirmed this was significantly
above chance, t(44) = 5.1, p < .001. For the children offering free recall,
there was no effect of age (3-year-olds: M = 71.9%, SD = 30%, t(20) = 3.3,
p = .004; 4-year-olds:M = 72%, SD = 29%, t(23) = 3.8, p = .001) or task type
(ownership M = 75%, SD = 26%, t(23) = 4.7, p = .001; control M = 69%,
SD = 33%, t(20) = 2.6, p = .001) on the percentage of correct ownership
scores obtained.
Recognition
As shown in Table 8, recognition was above chance in both tasks and age
groups and for all encoding dimensions.
As for recall, a univariate ANOVA with age and task type as a between-
subjects variable indicated that age had a significant effect on recognition
performance, F(1, 46) = 10.6, p = .02, ηp2 = 0.19, with 4-year-olds outper-
forming 3-year-olds. Again, there was no significant between-subjects effect of
task type, F(1, 46) = 0.7, p = 0.39, ηp2 = 0.016.
Within the ownership task, children recognized marginally nonsignifi-
cantly more self- than other-owned stimuli, F(1, 23) = 3.6, p = .069, ηp2 = 1.4,
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TABLE 8
Experiment 7 Recognition Performance Split by Task, Encoding Dimension, and
Age Group
Age Group
Recognition Overall 3-Year-Old 4-Year-Old
Self-Referent Ownership Task
Overall M = 13.4 (84%),
SD = 0.6
M = 12.1 (76%),
SD = 0.9
M = 14.7 (92%),
SD = 0.7
(t(24) = 11.8, p < .001) (t(11) = 6.5, p < .001) (t(12) = 11.9, p < .001)
Self-owned M = 7 (87.5%),
SD = 0.3
M = 6.3 (79%),
SD = 0.6
M = 7.6 (95%),
SD = 0.3
(t(24) = 12.4, p < .001) (t(11) = 5.8, p < .001) (t(12) = 17.3, p < .001)
Other-owned M = 6.3 (79%),
SD = 0.4
M = 5.6 (70%),
SD = 0.6
M = 7.1 (89%),
SD = 0.5
(t(24) = 8.4, p < .001) (t(11) = 4.5, p < .001) (t 12) = 8.1, p < .001)
Non-Self-Referent Ownership Task
Overall M = 12.5 (78%),
SD = 0.8
M = 10.8 (67.5%),
SD = 1.2
M = 14.3 (89%),
SD = 0.8
(t(24) = 8.1, p < .001) (t(12) = 4.1, p = .01) (t(11) = 10.1, p < .001)
Blue basket M = 6.1 (76%),
SD = 0.45
M = 5.2 (65%),
SD = 0.7
M = 7.1 (89%),
SD = 0.5
(t(24) = 6.8, p < .001) (t(12) = 3.2, p = .007) (t(11) = 8.7, p < .001)
Green basket M = 6.4 (80%),
SD = 0.4
M = 5.6 (70%),
SD = 0.7
M = 7.2 (90%),
SD = 0.4
(t(24) = 7.9, p < .001) (t(12) = 3.8, p = .002) (t(11) = 10.8, p < .001)
Note.—Eighteen children performed at ceiling (five 3-year-olds, thirteen 4-year-olds).
whereas in the control task there was no suggestion of a recognition bias, F(1,
23) = 0.49, p = .49, ηp2 = 0.021. There were no significant interactions with
age.
Children gave accurate source-monitoring information for an above-
chance average of 70% (SD= 19%) of items they recognized, t (49)= 7.1, p<
.01. As in Experiments 5 and 6, 3-year-olds (M = 68.4%, SD = 19%, t(24) =
4.8, p < .01) and 4-year-olds (M = 71.5%, SD = 21%, t(24) = 5.9, p < .01)
performed comparably. Children also performed similarly in giving accurate
ownership (M = 71.7%, SD = 24%; t(24) = 4.5, p < .01) and color location
information (M = 68.2%, SD = 15%; t(24) = 6, p < .01).
Discussion
Three- and four-year-old children recalled significantly more shopping
items assigned to their basket than shopping items belonging to the experi-
menter, despite equal physical engagement with both types of item. Although
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failing to reach significance (perhaps as ceiling effects were again common
at 36%), the recognition data also followed this pattern. In contrast, children
showed no recall or recognition bias when shopping items were assigned to
baskets based on basket color. This confirms that the bias within the owner-
ship data might be considered an SRE, providing novel evidence to support a
cognitive SRE in children as young as 3.5 years and empirically substantiating
the hypothesized link between ownership and the self. Moreover, these biases
are evidently not due to increased engagement with the (arguably more in-
teresting) ownership task. There was no significant difference in either the
number of items remembered between assignment tasks or the number of
items remembered with the correct source information (self vs. other and
blue vs. green). In any case, this final test of the SRE confirms that for both 3-
and 4-year-olds cognitive self-reference in the form of an ownership claim is
sufficient to support a within-subjects recall advantage for self-referent stimuli.
The aspects of cognitive self-recognition that support this SRE, and the other
SREs reported in this volume, are open to discussion. In the final chapter, we
discuss the implications, limitations, and applications of the current research.
NOTE
9. One constraint of Experiments 5 and 6 is that children may have relied on the color
of zoos to distinguish between animals. No child made any explicit reference to zoo color in
either session. Moreover, answering the ownership question correctly in the second session,
when the zoos were absent, ultimately required that the child acknowledged the link between
stimuli (animal or zoo) and owner. Nevertheless, we thought it wise to control for the effects
of color in the self-referent version of this final study. As the results show, having zoos of the
same color had no impact on the SRE. This confirms that color information (originally an
accident of esthetics) was unlikely to have produced the SRE found in Experiments 5 and 6.
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V. I REMEMBER ME: IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS,
AND APPLICATIONS
In recognizing aspects of ourselves in the environment we make a cogni-
tive connection between external and internal self-representation. Moreover,
by virtue of connection to the self, material considered self-referent at encod-
ing has priority at retrieval. As described earlier, this mnemonic advantage
has been repeatedly demonstrated for adults (Englekamp, 1998; Symons &
Johnson, 1997) and occasionally for school-age children (Baker-Ward et al.,
1990; Bennett & Sani, 2008; Millward et al., 2000; Pullyblank et al., 1985; Sui
& Zhu, 2005; Summers & Craik, 1994), but not for preschool children. How-
ever, the experiments reported in this volume provide original evidence to
suggest that SREs, measured in a variety of ways, can be observed in the event
memory of children as young as 3 years. This confirms that 3-year-olds’ capac-
ity to self-recognize has a functional impact beyond that previously measured
in cognitive paradigms (such as the body-as-obstacle test and the mirror mark
test of self-recognition). This final chapter offers discussion of the current
findings with reference to the SRE literature and ends by relating this to the
“bigger picture” of functional self-awareness.
THE CURRENT FINDINGS
Experiment 1 indicated that even where self-reflection is propriocep-
tive (as in when we perform an action) or ambiguous (as when we match
our gender or age group or name to some external stimulus), a mnemonic
bias in recognition memory can occur. Experiment 2 indicated that per-
sonal identity has a strong pull in determining the focus of attention. When
children were asked to remember objects that had been presented adjacent
to an external self-representation of the self, 4-year-olds encountered some
difficulty and 3-year-olds failed to recall the connection between self and
object. Experiments 3 and 4 reversed this effect, demonstrating that when
to-be-remembered objects were visually and verbally integrated with self- and
other-photographs, short-term recognition memory for self-referent mate-
rial was superior. Provided the memory task was sufficiently demanding, this
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recognition bias was significant for both 3-year-olds (Experiment 3) and
4-year-olds (Experiment 4). Confirming that self-focus is at least sometimes the
mediator of mnemonic self-bias, Experiments 3 and 4 also demonstrated that
when faced with their reflection at encoding, children recognized relatively
few objects that were associated with others by virtue of a second person pro-
noun (e.g., “He bounced the ball”). Finally, Experiments 5, 6, and 7 showed
that preschool children canmake active links between the self-system and oth-
erwise neutral stimuli by encoding ownership information for novel objects.
Moreover, as for the basic associations made between self and object in previ-
ous experiments, this abstract cognitive connection resulted in a mnemonic
bias for self-referent (in this case self-owned) stimuli. Unlike previous
experiments though, this SRE was most consistently shown in recall data.
We hypothesized that the magnitude of SRE, if reflecting the mnemonic
“strength” of the self-concept, might be used to measure levels of self-
awareness in preschool children. This would provide a nonbinary index of
self-awareness that could differentiate between children (and therefore be
correlated to other developments) beyond the 2nd year. In the event, as in
previous studies with older children (Baker-Ward, Hess, and Flannigan, 1999;
Bennett & Sani, 2008; Millward et al., 2000; Pullyblank et al., 1985; Sui &
Zhu, 2005), we found little evidence for developmental progression in the
magnitude of SREs. Three- and 4-year-olds returned significant SREs of sim-
ilar magnitude whether the encoding task was kinesthetic, visual-cognitive,
or built on an abstract cognitive link. However, several aspects of our results
suggest that the use of the SRE paradigm to track developmental changes may
not be as straightforward as anticipated.
For example, there are changes in memory capacity between the 3rd and
4th year (observable in all of the experiments reported) that have implications
for the SRE. Specifically, as memory capacity approaches ceiling within a task,
the potential for revealing an effect decreases. This means, as demonstrated
in Experiment 4, that there is a need to calibrate task difficulty to age group.
Unless one canmanipulate the task such that memory performance is roughly
equal, this precludes neat comparison of the magnitude of effects between
age groups. Although one could enter total memory score as a covariate, the
variance in the data predicted by this factor (the effect of memory capacity)
is likely to be much larger than the variance predicted by the difference score
between self and other (the effect of self-reference), meaning that the ability
to show amain task effect would be substantially weakened. Given the strength
of the relationship between age and memory capacity, the implications for an
age interaction would bemore serious still. One way to avoid this problem is to
consider the change in any SRE not quantitatively but qualitatively; determin-
ing if the SRE found reaches significance for each age group when analyzed
independently. However, our data suggest that this qualitative measure would
divide children only for a limited period prior to the 3rd year. In other words,
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without equal memory performance, the SRE paradigm cannot improve on
mirror self-recognition as an index of developmental self-awareness.
There is also theoretical reason to question the capacity of the SRE
paradigm to index developmental changes in self-awareness in the preschool
years. Specifically, althoughwe can confirm that self-referent events are tagged
and given priority in preschool children’s event memory, the mechanistic
bases of the SREs reported are unclear. In addition to unique kinesthetic
feedback, our data suggest at least two cognitive candidates to support self-
bias in memory: an elaborated self-concept (superior encoding and retrieval
for self) and self-focus (selective encoding for self). Importantly, only the
former offers a clear prediction of developmental progression. The capacity
to self-focus is binary, meaning that once it is acquired, we might expect little
change in the magnitude of the resulting self-bias. By contrast, an SRE based
on elaboration of the self-concept would be expected to increase as one’s self-
concept increases. This might explain why Sui and Zhu’s (2005) visual SRE
uncovered no increase in the magnitude of the SRE between 5 and 10 years
and why our similar visual-cognitive paradigms (Experiments 2–4) found no
evidence for developmental change between the 3rd and 4th year. In keep-
ing with this explanation, the only significant age interaction was found in
Experiment 7, where the self-referent nature of stimuli was fully internally
mediated. It seems plausible that this paradigm would be less susceptible to
the forces of selective attention than those in which stimuli are accompanied
by an external representation of self (Experiments 1–4).
Whatever the reason for the lack of consistent age effects, their absence
contributes to the debate regarding children’s explicit reference to the self
in the past. Contrary to Povinelli et al.’s (1996) suggestion of a lag in self-
conservation between the 3rd and 4th year, we found no evidence to suggest
that 3-year-olds have a self-specific retrieval failure. In Experiments 3–7, both
3- and 4-year-olds were above chance in monitoring whether remembered
objects were encoded in self- or other-referent contexts. In other words, they
made accurate reference to the self and other in the past. Moreover, this
cognitive “tag” was accompanied by a significant SRE: Children recognized
more objects associated with the self in the past than associated with other
people. In the only case when source monitoring was below chance, for 3-
year-olds in Experiment 2, the SRE was nonsignificant. This result implies that
explicit self-recognition may be a necessary for self-bias to occur, and could
be taken as support for Howe and colleagues’ (Howe & Courage, 1993, 1997;
Howe et al., 2003) proposal that explicit self-recognition is a requirement
for autobiographically organized memories. However, do these self-referent
memories fulfill the criteria for “autobiographical” recollection? Given that
the children could both recognize stimuli, and accurately answer questions
about the context of its encoding, it seems fair to suggest that they were
experiencing something akin to episodic memory. Where the significant SRE
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is found in recall data (as in Experiments 5 and 7), or the delay is long (as
in Experiments 1, 5, and 6), the case is stronger still. Answering the source-
monitoring question accurately required explicit reference to the role of self.
If we accept that the memories refer to a specific episode in the past, and
more particularly to the role of self (as distinguished from other) in this
episode, we come close to the definition of autobiographical memory. This
is particularly clear in cases where the self in the past referred to is not an
external representation (as for self-image in Experiments 1–4) but an internal
one (as in Experiments 5–7).
However, the distinction between remembering (when one recalls a spe-
cific episode) and knowing (when one stores information from the past)
(Tulving, 2002) introduces a major caveat to this conclusion. The use of
novel stimuli and the control of kinesthetic feedback in the current exper-
iments ensured that children could not distinguish self- and other-referent
memories on an associative level. Nevertheless, it is not clear that their mem-
ories contained experiential information of the sort that would be required
to fulfill this stricter definition of autobiographical memory. In support of a
developmental lag for experiential information, Perner and Ruffman (1995)
provided evidence to suggest that children under the age of 4 years fail to
acknowledge their own past experiences as a relevant factor in current knowl-
edge. For example, when shown or told the hiding place of an object and
shortly afterwards asked to retrieve it, 3-year-olds could find the object, but
they could not state the source of their knowledge. However, although the
answer required may appear simple (“I saw you hide it there”), the question
“How do you know that?” is both conceptually complex and socially challeng-
ing. Recall, Saltmarsh and Mitchell (1999) corrected a similar result (denial
of previous belief in the appearance/reality task) by supporting preschool
children’s memories using video footage of their experience. Might a sim-
ilar procedure be telling here? Certainly, it seems hasty to conclude that a
3-year-old’s failure to answer a question implies a lack of knowledge.
Considering the problem from another angle, it is not clear how one
could distinguish between memory and knowledge in an age-appropriate
way (other than controlling for associative learning). In studies with adults,
this has been achieved by introspective self-report. Given Perner and Ruff-
man’s (1995) result, it appears that this would not be a fruitful approach
for preschool children. Indeed, it is worth noting that the remember/know
distinction has not proven intuitive. Adult participants have been found to
struggle with it to the extent that it has been debated in the literature whether
such a categorical distinction actually exists, or if it would be better to think in
terms of a quantitative scale of the strength of the memory (Rotello, MacMil-
lan, Reeder, & Wong, 2005). In fact, the latter method may well be appli-
cable to a preschool sample. In the current research, it was not uncommon
for children to refuse to select an item in recognition tests, implying that
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they had meta-cognitive awareness of the strength (or weakness) of their
memories. Perhaps future research might then consider children’s subjective
perceptions of accuracy in combination with objective measures as a proxy
for remember/know distinctions. For example, we might consider “weakly”
recognized stimuli with inaccurate (or below chance) source monitoring in-
formation to indicate knowledge, and the opposite pattern as indicative of a
“true” episodic memory.
An issue separate to the extent to which specific self-referent memories
might be considered autobiographical is the extent to which the existence of
a memory bias is informative regarding the temporally extended self. In terms
of building a life narrative, an SRE is positive regardless of the mechanism.
A self-bias based on the organizational properties of the self-concept has the
potential to inform our understanding of the memory structures underpin-
ning the storage and retrieval of self-referent information. By contrast, an SRE
based on selective attention has the potential to inform our understanding
of how self-referent information is gathered in real time. It is likely that both
processes, and indeed the kinesthetic feedback controlled for in the Exper-
iments 2–7, contribute to a mature autobiographical memory system. The
implications for self-conservation are more complex. A concept-based SRE
might be taken to imply neurological self-conservation, leaving one to return
to the debate concerning the extent to which explicit reference to the self in
the past is made. However, if the SRE is attention based, self-recognition in
the present (selective encoding) is all that is required for bias to occur.
Could this provide an alternative explanation for the lack of correlation
between performance on Povinelli et al.’s (1996) DSR task and themagnitude
of ownership SRE in Experiment 6? The between-subjects ownership SRE that
would be expected if the effect was founded on the elaborative properties of
the self-concept did not reach significance in Experiments 5 and 7. This
might point to a mechanistic difference. An SRE based on self-focus would
be expected to be expressed in a within-subjects test only. However, although
a self-focus explanation fits the type of effect found, as set out earlier, it is
not clear that this explanation fits the task. Contrary to Experiments 2–4, the
stimuli here were initially self-neutral. Although it is conceivable that self-focus
could have a post hoc effect, occurring after previously neutral stimuli has
been judged self-referent, the subsequent removal of stimuli (to place in zoo
or basket) means that any continued self-focus would have to be ruminative.
Perhaps, then, the SRE was based not on the self-concept or “external” self-
focus but on “sticky processing” of self-referent stimuli at encoding.
What the current research makes clear is that the elaborative or organi-
zational nature of the self-concept is not the only plausible explanation for
mnemonic self-bias, particularly given the different methods that have been
employed. Moreover, it is vital that a variety of methods are employed if the
SRE is to be considered anything other than a laboratory effect, unique to
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the processing of trait descriptions. By measuring SREs based on motor self-
recognition, visual self-recognition, and cognitive self-recognition, we start
to build a picture of the “real world” potential of self-reference to inform
cognitive processing. Moreover, we open new possibilities for mechanisms
underlying the SRE. To illustrate, just prior to their innovative paper noting
the potential for ownership judgments to index self-reference (Cunningham
et al., 2008), Turk, Cunningham, andMacrae (2008) published a study noting
that “incidental” self-referent processing (in this case stating whether stimuli
was shown above or below one’s own name) is sufficient to produce an SRE.10
This allowed them to argue against (or with) an elaborative processing ac-
count, for a more automatic augmentation of encoding, which they suggest
might be based on capturing the participants attention (the self-focus expla-
nation) or even their affect. The latter explanation is based on an established
affective bias for self, such that self-reference is often associated with posi-
tive feelings. Turk et al. (2008) suggest that due to the positive emotional
stimulation arising from self-reference, there may be increased activity in the
amygdala and hippocampal areas, which in turn may enhance mnemonic
processing.
Both attention and affective explanations could be applied to the “inci-
dental” SREs found in Experiments 1–4. Moreover, as noted by Cunningham
et al. (2008), as the positivity bias extends to self-referent objects, the affective
mechanism potentially contributes to the ownership SREs found in Experi-
ments 5–7. Research like this highlights that, despite the relatively long history
of SRE literature, the effect is far from comprehensively understood. Further,
unless we alter our perspective on the SRE paradigm (separating implicit
from explicit processing, studying the ontogeny of the effect, using different
forms of self-reference, etc.) this knowledge is likely to remain limited.
This is not to say that research using the original paradigm has run its
course. Two particularly promising lines of enquiry involve application of the
trait adjective paradigm to delineate the boundaries of self, neurologically
and socially. In recent years researchers have begun to supplement behav-
ioral SRE data with data from neuroimaging (see Northoff et al., 2006, for a
meta-analysis). Several studies have demonstrated medial prefrontal cortical
activation during the trait description SRE task (Craik et al., 1999; Johnson,
Baxter et al., 2002; Kelley et al., 2002; Ray et al., 2009). Supporting the idea
that this might be a center for “autobiographical” processing, some find that
activity here is particularly prominent when the adjective is judged to be self-
relevant, and the stimuli are later remembered (Fossati et al., 2003; Macrae,
Moran, Heatherton, Banfield, & Kelley, 2004; Moran, Macrae, Heatherton,
Wyland, & Kelley, 2006). However, the medial prefrontal cortex is not the
only area activated during self-processing. In keeping with (and extending)
the affective explanation introduced above, researchers have found that judg-
ing adjectives self-relevant inevitably has some emotional consequence, the
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valence of which is dependent on their desirability. This affective reaction is
typically shown by activity in the ventral anterior cingulate cortex (Fossati et
al., 2003; Moran et al., 2006) and may contribute to the memorable nature of
self-referent stimuli. In addition to confirming that brain imaging techniques
have the capacity to advance our understanding of the neural mechanisms
underlying the SRE, this example supports our assertion that, to be fully un-
derstood, self-reflection should be considered both a subjective and objective
process.
An alternative way to observe the boundaries of self, taking emotional
attachment into account, is to vary the extent to which the processing task
might be interpreted as self-referent. Although the original SRE paradigm
used semantic processing as a control, an early paradigm shift was to con-
trast self-referent processing with processing of other people. Intended to
allow assessment of the importance of familiarity to the SRE (and to pro-
vide a control with equivalent processing demands), researchers contrasted
the self-processing task with a task in which the stimuli were judged rele-
vant to a highly familiar person (such as the participant’s mother). These
studies showed that other-referent processing could lead to similar biases as
self-referent processing, challenging the “special” nature of the effect (Bower
& Gilligan, 1979; Kuiper & Rogers, 1979). However, Symons and Johnson’s
(1997) meta-analysis showed that rather than being a function of familiarity,
biases in memory associated with person processing rely on intimacy with the
target. Processing stimuli with a highly familiar celebrity in mind leads to less
successful mnemonic retrieval than processing the stimuli with reference to
a close relative, partner, or friend.
Aron and colleagues (Aron, Aron, & Norman 2001; Aron, Aron, Tudor,
& Nelson, 1991) argued that the effect implies that intimate others are sub-
sumed as part of the self-concept. Neuroimaging studies comparing self with
intimate other have failed to consistently support or contradict this hypoth-
esis (see Vanderwal, Hunyadi, Grupe, Connors, & Schultz, 2008, for review).
Nevertheless, this debate is important as it highlights the potential for the
SRE paradigm to expand our understanding of the concept of self, quite
literally. Indeed, it would be interesting in the future to compare children’s
processing for self and others of varying degrees of intimacy. This could help
to determine whether the growth of self-awareness is best conceived of as
increased separation between self and other or, contrary to this traditional
position, increased acceptance of other. As noted, both Baker-Ward et al.
(1990) and Bennett and Sani (2008) had some success in demonstrating that
at least by the age of 5 years, children remember a similar amount of informa-
tion processed in reference to in-groups (family and peers) as processed in
reference to themselves. However, implying developmental increases in sepa-
ration of self and close other, Ray et al. (2009) found that although 7-year-olds
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commonly remembered more trait adjectives processed in reference to their
mother than to themselves, 13-year-olds showed the opposite pattern.
The SREparadigmhas also been applied to investigate the atypical bound-
aries of the self commonly found in autistic spectrum conditions (ASCs). Lom-
bardo, Barnes, Wheelwright, and Baron-Cohen (2007) noted that although
it was originally hypothesized that individuals with ASCs were shut off from
others due to complete self-focus (e.g., Kanner, 1943), more recent theorists
have proposed that ASCs might be characterized by an absence of self-focus
(e.g., Frith, 2003). Absent, or in some cases reversed, SPT effects observed
in children and adults with ASCs support this latter notion (Hare, Mellor, &
Azmi, 2007; Millward et al., 2000; Russell & Jarrold, 1999). However, other
researchers using similar methods have found the SPT effect to be intact in
individuals with ASC (Lind & Bowler, 2009; Williams & Happe, 2009). The
pattern of results for the SRE is also mixed. Whereas Toichi et al. (2002)
reported that individuals with ASCs fail to show a mnemonic bias for trait
adjectives judged self-referent, Lombardo et al. (2007) found an SRE which
was reduced relative to controls, but significant. A fuller understanding of the
mechanism(s) drivingmnemonic self-bias has the potential not only to resolve
these inconsistencies, but to facilitate our understanding of self-processing in
ASCs. For example, Lombardo et al. (2007) found that their ASC group was
impaired on four measures of empathy relative to controls. If this affective
deficit also applies in situations where the self rather than other is the route of
emotion (e.g., where self is required to be judged positively or negatively), it
may be that the affective route to mnemonic self-bias is blocked for those with
ASCs. If, as implied by the neurological data, cognitive and affective mecha-
nisms work in tandem in the trait adjective paradigm, this would explain the
reduced, but sometimes significant, effect.
The current research makes a valuable contribution to existing SRE lit-
erature by confirming that preschool children benefit mnemonically from
various types of self-reference. In terms of ontogeny, we find that SREs have
an early onset that globalizes to physical, visual, and cognitive channels of
self-reference. Having established their presence, future research should aim
to pinpoint the mechanism or mechanisms that underlie these effects. This
is particularly important because different mechanisms have differing impli-
cations for the ontogeny of the effect in typically and nontypically develop-
ing populations. Evidently, investigation of the self-reference advantage in
childhood will encounter challenges similar to, and over and above, those
presented in research with adults. However, by carefully characterizing the
types of effects found at different ages, we have the potential to tease apart the
mnemonic impact of self-recognition as it first occurs. As outlined earlier, this
process, or capacity, has clear parallels to both autobiographical memory and
self-conservation. For this reason, the SRE paradigm may offer an accessible
route to the study of these complex human phenomena in development.
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THE BIGGER PICTURE
The wider aim of the current research was to measure the functional
impact of self-awareness. As noted in the introductory chapter, the only previ-
ously empirically demonstrated consequence of early self-awareness has been
mark-directed behavior in the mirror self-recognition test. The experiments
reported here demonstrate that cognitive self-recognition has more substan-
tial consequences than prompting adjustments in self-presentation. Specifi-
cally, self-recognition appears to have an executive role in cognition, organiz-
ing attention, and mnemonic storage to give self-referent events mnemonic
priority. Returning to the distinction made between the agentive “I” self and
the descriptive “me” it seems that “I” is primed to gather information about,
and remember, “me.” Not only do individual self-referent memories have sur-
vival value, but they also presumably play a formative role in our experience
of personal identity as continuous. Without this continuity there would be no
attachment to the self (cognitive or emotional) and therefore no motivation
for self-preservation. This applies both at the basic level of survival and at
the more complex level of morality (maintaining an “ideal” self). Importantly
then, the SRE paradigm has the potential to index a cognitive-behavioral
consequence of self-recognition congruent with the evolutionarily and devel-
opmentally powerful implications of self-awareness.
Moreover, consideration of the possible mechanisms driving SREs make
clear that experience of the self is holistic. Previous developmental research
has neglected the agentive self after self-recognition, behaving as though one
nascent form of self-awareness (measured in preference tests) has been su-
perseded by a more important form (indexed by the mirror test, linguistic
self-reference, and self-conscious emotion). However, it is clear that the feel-
ing of “owning” the self (subjective self-recognition) is equally important to
the SRE as identifying properties of the self (objective self-recognition). This
holds whether the SRE is based on association of material with an elabo-
rated self-concept, on selective encoding of self-referent information, or on
the emotional consequences of self-processing. In fact, the “special” nature
of self-processing may hinge on agency. By virtue of having an elaborated
concept of a familiar person I may show a mnemonic bias for information
processed in relation to that person. If I have a high level of attachment to
this familiar other, processing information relevant to them may also activate
my self-concept or affect, lending superiority. However, it is not possible that
I will gather the same amount of information about another person as myself
(giving me an equivalently elaborated or defined concept of them) and feel
the same level of attachment to them (allowing the same quality of elabora-
tion and brain activation). This is simply because “I” am always with “me” and
not always, or ever truly, with them. I am anchored to a different body and
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mind, and to this solipsistic extent the self (and its mnemonic consequence)
is special.
Using the SRE paradigm, it is possible to elucidate the processes leading
to an idea of self in, and as an executer of, memory. As noted earlier, it is
likely that the experience of self-continuity arising from these processes has
far reaching affective and behavioral consequences. However, it should also
be possible to directly measure the affective and behavioral consequences of
the self. Several theories of the self as a “system” have been proposed; all
agree that maintaining a consistent idea of self has a motivational impact
on adults’ behavior (e.g., Bandura, 1986; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Duval &
Silvia, 2001; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon,
1986; Higgins, 1987; Leary & Baumeister, 2000). Each of these theories offers
testable predictions that can be adapted for developmental research. How-
ever, despite considerable effort toward testing these predictions in adults,
equivalent developmental tests remain almost nonexistent. As set out in the
Introduction, this reflects a regrettable neglect of experimental measurement
of the consequences of self-awareness in children.
To illustrate this point, consider the case of Duval andWicklund’s (1972)
objective self-awareness theory. Duval and Wicklund (1972) asserted that self-
focused attention typically results in positive or negative affect, dependent on
one’s perceived consistency with salient standards (e.g., the social desirability
of a trait). As a result of the affective consequences of self-evaluation, people
who judge themselves as inconsistent with the standard will be motivated ei-
ther to adjust their to conform or to withdraw from the evaluation-inducing
situation. In this way, cognitive and affective equilibrium regarding the self is
maintained. According to this theory, any stimulus that reminds one of the
self as an object (e.g., mirrors, audiences, cameras) will induce self-focused
attention, followed by a cognitive and affective self-evaluative reaction, fol-
lowed by a self-preserving action. Thus, objective self-awareness theory offers
a testable theory of the complex relationship between self-recognition, cog-
nition, affect, and behavior.
However, despite the inclusion of mirror self-recognition as a motivating
variable, only a handful of studies have considered the ontogeny of these
effects (Beaman, Klentz, Diener, & Svanum, 1979; Froming, Allen, & Jensen,
1985; Froming, Nasby, & McManus, 1998; Morin & Everett, 1991). Further,
only one of these studies included preschool children. Beaman et al. (1979)
recruitedhomeowners atHalloween to secretly observe the behavior of groups
of trick-or-treaters who were left alone with a bowl of sweets with the instruc-
tion to take only one. The trick-or-treaters were between the ages of 1 and 13
years. In line with Duval and Wixklund’s (1972) theory, Beaman et al. (1979)
found that children in the mirror condition were significantly more likely
to follow their hosts’ instruction than children in the no-mirror condition.
The magnitude of the mirror effect increased with age, remaining significant
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for all but the youngest age group, consisting of 1- to 4-year-olds. However,
consideration of 1- to 4-year-olds as a homogenous group may have compro-
mised detection of an effect in older preschoolers. Considerable changes in
self-awareness occur in this period, most notably the onset of mirror self-
recognition.
To remedy this, we recently employed a similar temptation paradigm to
assess the influence of self-recognition on a group of 3- and 4-year-olds’ trans-
gression of behavioral rules (Ross, Anderson, & Campbell, 2011). Inspired by
a method pioneered by Lewis, Stanger, and Sullivan (1989), children were
left alone in a room with a box that contained a toy and asked not to peek. As
for the older children in Beaman et al.’s (1979) study, both 3- and 4-year-olds
were more likely to adhere to the rule, and slower to break it, when the game
was played in front of a large mirror than in conditions where the self was
less salient. Although prosocial behavior has previously been correlated with
the onset of mirror self-recognition (Bischof-Kohler, 1991; Johnson, 1982;
Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992), this provides perhaps the first direct evidence
that self-recognition plays a functional role in preschoolers’ self-regulation.
Moreover, it demonstrates that in addition to preschoolers’ self-recognition
potentially having a “cold” executive function in organizing memory, early
self-recognition may have a “hot” executive function, namely the inhibition of
socially unacceptable behavior. If we are to develop a comprehensive overview
of the ontogenetic impact of self-recognition, it is important that both forms
of regulation are explored.
Research of this type also has the potential to elucidate the phylogeny
of self. As for children, the only established measure of self-awareness for
nonhuman animals is the mirror mark test of self-recognition. The evidence
for nonhuman primates indicates that only great apes pass this test, implying
that the capacity for self-recognition is unique to the hominoid evolution-
arily line. However, recently there have been controversial claims for mir-
ror self-recognition in other animals, including dolphins (Reiss & Marino,
2001), elephants (Plotnick, de Waal, & Reiss, 2006), and magpies (Prior,
Schwarz, & Gu¨ntu¨rku¨n, 2008). The case for a unique hominoid capacity for
self-recognition is therefore challenged not only by these claims but also by
the mirror test’s limited ecological validity. Given to the scarcity of reflec-
tive surfaces in nature, mirror-guided mark reaching cannot be the primary
function of self-awareness. Indeed, the mirror mark test of self-recognition
is designed to demonstrate a concept rather than qualify it. However, with-
out qualification, we have no empirical basis to argue that the self-awareness
of a magpie is any different than the self-awareness of a chimpanzee or an
18-month-old human.
One approach to this problem is to search for functional aspects of the
human adult-like self in other animals. For example, it would be relatively easy
to adapt the SPT paradigm for those animals whose memories and physical
78
I REMEMBER ME: IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND APPLICATIONS
dexterity are comparable to humans. This is important because, although
we know that many animals experience agency (Mitchell, 2002), the cogni-
tive consequences of this experience are unclear. Due to a lack of exposure
to their own image, animals’ representations of self are unlikely to center
on their own facial features, precluding application of the visual-cognitive
SREs measured in Experiments 2–5.11 However, it may be possible to study
mnemonic group-reference effects by pairing to-be-remembered stimuli with
representations of familiar and unfamiliar conspecifics. Further, one could
assess the impact of conspecific representations on socio-behavioral decisions,
such as sharing food. Mnemonic or social group–reference effects might im-
ply that the animal has a functional concept of “someone like me” from which
we could extrapolate a functional concept of self. Finally, the concept of own-
ership has the potential to bring these strands of research together. Itakura
(1992) demonstrated that one chimpanzee spontaneously associated her own
green feeding bowl with herself, and two differently colored feeding bowls
with two other apes. If this physical self-association were accompanied by an
emotional attachment or a mnemonic bias (for novel stimuli placed in it),
might this fulfill the criteria for a functional concept of “mine”?
This monograph explored one function of self-recognition in preschool
children: External events are tagged as self-referent, rendering them memo-
rable. Our results make clear that the mechanisms underlying this function
require further study. In addition to stimulating research in this specific
area, we aim to stimulate research on other functional consequences of self-
recognition in children, adults, and nonhumans. Rather than discredit the
mirror mark test as an index of self-awareness, a position that 40 years of
research confirms would be untenable, we propose that this test should be
supplemented with a qualification of what it means to self-recognize, cogni-
tively, affectively, and behaviorally. Given that psychology is the study of the
embodied self at a macrolevel, this topic is of consequence to almost every
subdiscipline of the science. It is striking then that in certain areas, most no-
tably developmental and comparative research, experimental exploration of
the self has largely centered on one test.
NOTES
10. It should be noted that although Experiments 1, 5, and 6 use similar methods to these
studies, they were designed, completed, and interpreted prior to publication (or awareness)
of Turk and colleagues’ (2008) research. However, the design of Experiment 7 was directly
based on the methods of this research team.
11. Although it would be interesting to see if, with repeated exposure, animals who pass
the mirror mark test of self-recognition could discriminate their own features from those of
conspecifics, and if so, would this self-recognition lead to social or mnemonic self-reference
effects. Ultimately, it is also interesting to consider what effect not having a natural “tag” for
the self-concept such as a face or a name might have for the experience of self-awareness.
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